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The global environment continues to deteriorate, a phenome-
non which manifests itself in virtually every sphere featuring in-
teraction between man and nature. The full scale of this
deterioration may not be fully apparent because of the long time
lag between the emergence of environmental problems and their
recognition.  The extent of damage, actual and potential, to the
physical habitat inevitably varies from one segment of the system
to another, but it is considered to be serious overall and is deemed
to be verging on the critical in certain physical domains, although
an element of value judgement is doubtless involved in such as-
sessments. Where the disruption caused/to be caused is most
acute, global warming being an obvious case in point, one may le-
gitimately conjure up scenarios depicting uncontrolled escalation,
inadequate coping mechanisms, and widespread social
dislocation.1
The consequences of man’s abuse of nature have by no means
gone unnoticed.  They have been acknowledged and incorporated
into the policy agenda at the global, regional, national, and subna-
tional level.  The law has played a vital role in the process, both
through domestic and international channels.  Nevertheless, the
problems persist – indeed, they proliferate and assume more un-
palatable forms. Institutional responses are seldom commensu-
rate with challenges confronting communities and environmental
degradation is perhaps no exception to the norm. Ineffective scan-
ning apparatuses, political fragmentation, and slow organiza-
* Professor and Director of the Center of International and Public Law, Brunel
Law School, Brunel University; Honorary Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
Hong Kong.  I wish to thank Miron Mushkat for helping me navigate through eco-
nomic and policy studies territory.  The usual disclaimers apply.
1. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAM, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (Earthscan Publications 2002).
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tional adaptation tend to impede progress across the entire
strategy spectrum.  However, the environment may have fared
particularly poorly in this respect, exacting a potentially heavy
toll on mankind and the physical habitat it occupies.2
The gap between perceived needs and prevailing conditions
has triggered a quest for radical initiatives to shrink it.  Underly-
ing them are fundamental shifts in the way the human relation-
ship with nature is conceptualized, or in the supporting
theoretical (including the meta-theoretical component) fac¸ade.
The analytical breakthroughs and innovative policy designs have
emanated from a variety of academic disciplines and have increas-
ingly crossed traditional professional boundaries.  Scholars in the
field of international environmental law have not observed these
developments with a sense of passive detachment.  While not nec-
essarily inclined to embrace broad multidisciplinary perspectives,
they have markedly stretched their theoretical horizons and have
actively participated in the search for significantly more robust
problem-solving frameworks.3
The sweeping proposals that have originated from this source
have generally been predicated on the assumption that the pre-
sent, loosely structured international order, which is to a consider-
able degree the product of negotiated outcomes between largely
autonomous (albeit clearly not equal) sovereign entities, is not
conducive to ecological preservation.  The corollary is that this in-
herently fragile configuration ought to give way to one genuinely
global in nature and geared toward fulfilling the goals of sustaina-
ble development in an equitable, transparent, and accountable
fashion.  Such reasoning has culminated in suggestions to dramat-
ically reshape the international institutional architecture.  The
2. JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(University of Texas Press 2003); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW (Cambridge University Press 2003); REGINA S. AXELROD, THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY (CQ Press 2004) (1999).
3. See supra note 2; PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW: RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Routledge 1998); KLAUS BOS-
SELMANN, WHEN TWO WORLDS COLLIDE: SOCIETY AND ECOLOGY 175-79 (Stephen Pic-
ard ed., RSVP Publishing Company Limited 1995); ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
MARKET MECHANISMS: KEY CHALLENGES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY passim
(Klaus Bosselmann & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., Kluwer Law International Ltd.
1999); DUNCAN FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT (University of Manchester Press 2005); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUS-
TAINABILITY: A READER (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., Hart
Publishing 2006); MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW (Gerd Winter ed., Cambridge
University Press 2006).
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fostering of cosmopolitan/cosmopolitical (planetary in the extreme
version) democracy is one example.  While the realization of this
vision does not presuppose the dismantling of the nation state, it
requires the imposition of new limits on the exercise of sovereign
power through the formation of an extra layer of democratic gov-
ernance at the global (including regional) level.  Citizenship would
have to be extended accordingly.4
The idea of an International Court for the Environment is an-
other, more concrete, illustration of the desire to go to great
lengths to restore ecological harmony.  This is not an entirely new
notion, but it has been materially recycled and enhanced in recent
years.  The court is not envisioned as a stand-alone body but one
that embodies the globalist spirit and is an integral part of a
global authority for the environment, with parallel administrative
and juridical arms.  Moreover, although the proponents of the con-
cept duly acknowledge the vital role played by arbitration in such
matters, and even recognize the need for institutionalizing it fur-
ther (e.g., via an International Board of Arbitration for the Envi-
ronment), they contemplate an institution performing full-fledged
adjudication functions, enjoying efficacy beyond the specific par-
ties to the dispute (i.e., erga omnes), and profoundly engaged in
the creation of both evolutionary and innovative jurisprudence.5
Equally far-reaching have been the arguments in favor of ex-
tending human rights principles into the environmental realm.
This is tantamount to advancing normative claims about the bio-
sphere by employing human rights logic and enshrining them in
institutionally viable legal instruments.  The upshot is a “human
right to an adequate environment” firmly embedded in a strategi-
cally coherent and well-functioning administrative and judicial
4. See COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., Polity Press 1995); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY
AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE
(Polity Press 1995); DEMOCRACY AND GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT: SUSTAINABILITY,
RIGHTS, AND CITIZENSHIP (Brian Doherty & Marius de Geus eds., Routledge 1996);
Janna Thompson, Planetary Citizenship: the Definition and Defense of an Ideal, in
GOVERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL PROBLEMS, ETHICS, AND DEMOCRACY 135-
46 (Brendan Gleeson & Nicholas Low eds., Palgrave 2001); Daniele Archibugi, The
Politics of Cosmopolitical Democracy, in GOVERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL
PROBLEMS, ETHICS, AND DEMOCRACY 186-210 (Brendan Gleeson & Nicholas Low eds.,
Palgrave 2001); NICHOLAS LOW & BRENDAN GLEESON, JUSTICE, SOCIETY, AND NATURE:
AN EXPLORATION OF POLITICAL ECOLOGY (Routledge 1998); ANDREW DOBSON, CITIZEN-
SHIP AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Oxford University Press 2003).
5. See Amedo Postiglione, An International Court of the Environment, in GOV-
ERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 211-21.
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fabric that stretches beyond national boundaries.  The concept of
environmental human rights is inextricably linked with that of
environmental justice for it is almost invariably contended in such
contexts that all human beings ought to enjoy the opportunity to
lead environmentally sustainable lives or, to express it differently,
that an equitable distribution of environmental goods should be
achieved in normatively sound political settings.6
A degree of discord may be observed between those who focus
on environmental human rights in the narrow sense of the term
and those who seek to promote the broader idea of ecological
rights.  This stems from the intellectual tension, real or apparent,
between the anthropocentric and ecocentric philosophical perspec-
tives.  The former conceives the environment, whether explicitly
or implicitly, as a mere good which serves to satisfy human needs
and possesses no intrinsic value in itself.  By implication, environ-
mental rights are akin in all respects to other rights which reflect
morally justified individual demands.  The ecological viewpoint
posits that the environment is a condition of all life on earth.  It
follows that limitations on individual human freedom may be re-
quired in order to protect nature, which encompasses the human
species.7
This exploration of new paths to environmental sustainability
has been a distinctly Northcentric/Westcentric affair.  Scholars
from the Southern/Eastern hemisphere (excluding Australasia,
which does not fit neatly into the category) have not participated
on a meaningful scale in the enterprise.  Nor have the experiences
of countries/societies in that part of the globe featured in any sig-
nificant form in the assessment of the policy prescriptions gener-
ated in the course of the inquiries undertaken.  This may partly
reflect the fact that there is no critical mass of researchers en-
gaged in the study of international environmental law in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America.  However, that may not be an entirely
satisfactory explanation as ethicists with deep roots in non-North-
ern/Western civilizations have long grappled with complex issues
pertaining to the relationship between man and nature.  By the
same token, countries/societies located in the Southern/Eastern
hemisphere have had to confront serious ecological challenges and
6. See TAYLOR, supra note 3; Klaus Bosselmann, Human Rights and the Envi-
ronment: Redefining Fundamental Principles, in GOVERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 4, at 118-34.
7. See supra note 6.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/4
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their responses to the hazards facing them should not be
overlooked.
It is thus reasonable to infer that the geographical bias appar-
ently manifesting itself in what perhaps qualifies as the most
avant-garde work in the field of international environmental law
is mainly attributable to the implicit assumption that the formida-
ble problems encountered by humankind in this exceptionally dif-
ficult domain ought to be addressed as uniformly as possible
within a largely universal framework.  That may well be a legiti-
mate aspiration, but given the high degree of cultural and institu-
tional diversity witnessed around the globe, a credible case can be
made for broadening the analytical approach by juxtaposing re-
formist schemes emanating from Northern/Western circles with
realities prevailing elsewhere.  The aim of this paper is to make a
modest contribution in that direction by injecting a diluted relativ-
ist element into the evaluation of proposals to entrench environ-
mental human rights.  The experience of China is invoked for this
purpose and the more ambitious concept of ecological rights is rel-
egated to the periphery because the conclusions drawn may be ex-
tended beyond the specific area highlighted here.
THE RIGHTS IMPERATIVE
The analytical efforts to boldly recast the normative and pol-
icy discourse concerning the relationship between man and nature
are not entirely new.  The idea of elevating environmental rights
to a higher juridical level by coupling them with their human
rights counterparts has periodically surfaced in the international
law literature for the past three decades or so.  The process has
markedly accelerated, however, following the publication of a set
of essays compiled by Boyle and Anderson in the mid-1990’s.8
More recently, two books have been produced on the subject, one
by Hancock9 and one by Hayward.10  They stand out for their
8. ALAN E. BOYLE & MICHAEL R. ANDERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Clarendon Press 1996); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES (Alan E.
Boyle & David Freestone eds., Oxford University Press 1999); ROMINA PICOLOTTI &
JORGE D. TAILLANT, LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (University of
Arizona Press 2003); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE (Nico Schrijver & Friedel Weiss eds., Nijhoff 2004); LINDA A. MA-
LONE & SCOTT PASTERNACK, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGIES
TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Island Press 2006) (2004).
9. JOHN HANCOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: POWER, ETHICS, AND LAW
(Ashgate 2003).
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scope and the intensity of the arguments employed.  These trea-
tises are likely to serve as a frame of reference in future work on
environmental human rights.
Hancock proceeds along an extended path which consists of
interconnected philosophical, sociological, and legal elements.  He
embarks on his unambiguously critical journey by exposing the
apparent failings of the dominant economic rationality paradigm
and issuing a plea for its marginalization through a widespread
adoption, in a Kuhnian fashion (whereby emerging scientific con-
structs overwhelm entrenched ones),11 of an ecologically friendly
variant.  Economic rationality is portrayed as a value system
geared toward single-mindedly maximizing allocative efficiency
via market channels, seeking dominance over nature, fixated on
output expansion, and inevitably breeding normatively dubious
practices such as discounting.  Its inherent anthropocentric bent
notwithstanding, economic rationality is even said to fall dis-
tinctly short of properly acknowledging the intrinsic value of
human life.12
Epistemological paradigms do not operate in a social vacuum.
Rather, they are shaped and sustained by cultural impulses.13  Ec-
onomic rationality is no exception and thus cannot legitimately as-
pire to a universal status (an observation which, unfortunately for
its critics, may be extended to competing alternatives, including
the ecological vision).  Like other dominant epistemological para-
digms, it is the product of clearly-defined social power relations
prevailing in specific geographical/ historical settings.  Within this
structurally-oriented framework (as distinct from an agent-cen-
tered one, where individuals enjoy the discretion to design socio-
political systems free of exogenous constraints), external forces
impose substantial limits on autonomous action by supposedly in-
dependent agents.14
The economic rationality paradigm, according to Hancock,
has its roots in the capitalist form of social organization.  In such
an environment, powerful interests that reflect this structural
configuration exercise strong influence over the crystallization of
10. TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS (Oxford University
Press 2005).
11. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(University of Chicago Press 1962).
12. HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 15-33.
13. See MICHEL FOUCAULT & PAUL RABINOW, ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE
TRUTH (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans, New Press 1997) (1994).
14. HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 36-53.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/4
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culture, flow of ideas emanating from that source, the political
strategies embodying them, and public program implementation.
There are virtually no cracks in this robust fac¸ade, which displays
formidable resilience in the face of countervailing pressures.  The
Gramscian concept of hegemony, implying uniformity of funda-
mental interests and consistent effectiveness of multi-party action
across a wide array of complex issues, is employed to underline
the sturdiness of the system and its self-sustaining nature.15
Resistance to the forces underpinning economic rationality
and disrupting ecological balance is selectively offered by agents
but to no avail.  Another Gramscian concept, transformismo, is in-
voked for purposes of elucidation.  The corollary is that the capi-
talist power center resorts to co-optation of non-mainstream
elements in order to emasculate potential pockets of opposition
and forestall the emergence of alternative forms of social organi-
zation. Fringe groups campaigning for environmental sus-
tainability are thus, metaphorically, having their wings clipped by
being absorbed into the political establishment.  In return for
gaining access to the apex of power, they abandon the most radical
components of their strategic agendas and settle for the comforts
of the institutional status quo.  However, this is not entirely con-
sistent with the assertion that one may discern a trend toward the
constitutional and international recognition of environmental
rights, which, again metaphorically speaking, cannot be the prod-
uct of immaculate conception.16
To shield the biosphere from the severe damage inflicted upon
it by the dominant epistemological paradigm and the highly
skewed hegemonic social structure in which it is embedded, Han-
cock suggests that human right status be explicitly accorded to
two ecologically vital legal prescriptions: for an environment free
from toxic pollution and for the collective ownership of natural re-
sources.  The term “explicitly” should be highlighted in this con-
text.  The reason lies in the fact that the pursuit of this lofty
objective does not hinge, at the conceptual level, on a significant
adjustment in the underlying juridical architecture.  In reality,
the non-fulfillment of those two requirements amounts in many
respects to an infringement of existing human rights.  The shift in




\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER104.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-MAR-09 13:09
126 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
ineffectively mapped linkages rather than the design of a com-
pletely new blueprint.17
The courts increasingly view toxic pollution as a source of
public nuisance.  The implication, arguably, is that the emission of
poisonous substances amounts to a contravention of human rights
provisions pertaining to arbitrary interference with a person’s pri-
vacy, home, or correspondence.  Judges also have recently been in-
clined to characterize toxic pollution as risk, displaying greater
willingness to confront its deleterious effects.  Hancock emphati-
cally claims that all relevant criteria (identifiable actors, fault,
moral culpability, undermining of other party interests, and viola-
tion of her rights)18 for classifying toxic pollution as harm are
readily met, a decidedly stronger proposition, which goes a long
way toward dispelling any uncertainty regarding the apparent
connection to human rights covenants.19
The desire to imbue the collective ownership of natural re-
sources with greater legal authority reflects a belief that the ex-
isting rules governing the ownership of natural resources,
anchored in the capitalist form of social organization, are ecologi-
cally unsound.  The recourse to the term collective does not neces-
sarily suggest that Hancock favors state ownership because this is
merely one antidote to what he perceives as the current malaise.
His principal concern is to avert resource depletion through viable
non-private/communal/public ownership structures20 conducive to
a responsible management of pervasive market failure due to the
often-encountered problem of joint consumption of goods, coupled
with the impossibility of excluding non-contributing parties from
benefits obtained by agents who make tangible sacrifices to
achieve their consumption/ production objectives (resulting in en-
vironmentally challenging phenomena such as common pool re-
sources, free goods, open access goods, and public goods).21
Hancock considers the collective ownership of natural re-
sources to be consistent with the spirit and the letter of human
rights treaties.  Indeed, he contends that the latter invariably
grant possession to groups rather than individuals.  The right to
self-determination, in particular, has collective connotations and
17. Id. at 107-56.
18. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (Oxford University Press 1984).
19. HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 107-36.
20. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1990).
21. HANCOCK, supra note 9, at 137-54.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/4
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cannot be realized without the collective ownership of natural re-
sources.  A similar logic can be extended to the right not to be ex-
posed to hunger, given evidence that capitalist-style land
ownership has at times played a palpable role in creating condi-
tions that have led to large-scale starvation.22  Complex analytical
footwork is involved here as the illustrations offered are typically
selective, but the endeavor is not altogether unproductive because
the author places firmly, albeit controversially, the human rights
credentials of the collective ownership of natural resources on the
international legal agenda.
If the argument that normative blueprints cannot be divorced
from their social context is valid, the fulfillment of this ambitious
ecological vision is presumably contingent on far-reaching struc-
tural transformation.  Hancock thus advocates a shift from capi-
talism in its conventional form to a new variant of social
organization aptly categorized as liberalism. The latter rests on a
political foundation featuring equality in individual power, rights,
and duties. It also embodies the Mill principle that it is not merely
permissible for society to prevent a person from undertaking ac-
tivities which cause harm to others (emission of toxic pollution
and overexploitation of natural resources being notable examples),
but that there is a prima facie case for criminalizing such activi-
ties and penalizing the transgressor.23
The elaborate edifice constructed by Hancock is not without
flaws.  The economic rationality paradigm is subjected to a dis-
tinctly reductionist treatment. The allocative efficiency frame-
work is misrepresented.  Microeconomics is stripped of several of
its key dimensions (e.g., equity, freedom, transparency, and ac-
countability).  Capitalism is assumed to be in a state of static, as
distinct from dynamic, equilibrium and its considerable heteroge-
neity is not recognized.  Capitalist ills are addressed from a nar-
row and one-sided perspective.  The author refers extensively to
like-minded philosophers and critics, yet he largely eschews the
empirical social sciences and related academic disciplines. He
finds little inspiration in insights provided by students of eco-
nomic development, comparative economic systems, industrial ec-
onomics, public economics, political development, comparative
politics, public policy, and political sociology.  The liberal order
22. Id.
23. Id. at 109-16.
9
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sought as an alternative to capitalist excesses is vaguely outlined
and lacks solid institutional underpinnings.
However, a book may have serious shortcomings and yet qual-
ify as a very important scholarly landmark. Hancock demon-
strates far more effectively than any other writer that
international environmental law cannot be explored in isolation.
Its evolution is driven and constrained by powerful external forces
that need to be carefully dissected.  Absent an explicit acknowl-
edgement of such complex linkages, attempts at ecological prob-
lem description, explanation, evaluation, and subsequent
prescription are likely to prove to be unproductive.  The case for
grounding environmental rights, where appropriate, in existing
human rights is also, on the whole, cogently made.  The argu-
ments are not invariably compelling, but they are articulated in a
comprehensive and coherent manner.  The author offers an in-
triguing model which commands close attention and requires
thorough examination.
The Hayward book is a more focused, less contentious, yet
equally thought-provoking exploration of cutting-edge legal issues
concerning the relationship between man and nature.  He sets out
in pursuit of his analytical goals by sifting through various formu-
lations of environmental rights that are found in relevant authori-
tative sources. A number of permutations are considered (geared
toward the attainment of ecological equilibrium or balance, sus-
tainable development, development of the person, aesthetic en-
hancement, etc.) but eventually, preference is expressed for the
Brundtland definition of a right to an environment adequate for
health and well-being. Hayward acknowledges that this does not
necessarily qualify as an all-embracing formulation, yet he con-
vincingly argues that it is a workable one and merely anthropo-
centric in the weak sense of the term (i.e., it does not marginalize
nonhuman interests, even though, other things being equal, they
are not deemed to be entirely on par with their human
counterparts).24
The next, more challenging, step consists of a painstaking at-
tempt to establish that the right to an adequate environment (for
health and well-being) enjoys the status of a genuine human right.
Two opposing theoretical perspectives are juxtaposed for this pur-
pose.  One postulates that human rights are rights humans hold
by virtue of being human, or that they are essentially moral
24. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 26-61.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/4
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rights. The other claims that there are and can be no legitimate
wellsprings of moral norms located outside the domain of actual
social conventions and institutions within which concrete stan-
dards of ethical conduct have emerged over the course of history.
Hence, the potential distinction between rhetorical rights and
those of the real variety.  The latter extend beyond the realm of
pure morality or natural law and become embedded in specific in-
stitutional practices which carry a binding force.25
The first of these two perspectives is closely associated with
the influential work of Pogge, a political philosopher who differen-
tiates between moral human rights and legal ones and asserts
that the former do not derive their authority from the latter.26
His account incorporates an institutional element and is thus
broader than purely interactional approaches which squarely
place morality and human rights in the sphere of interpersonal
relations.27  Nevertheless, Pogge rejects the notion that juridica-
tion is a necessary, or even sufficient, condition for the fulfillment
of the principles embodied in human rights. Where those princi-
ples can be upheld through alternative institutional practices,
juridication is by definition not called for.
This stance contrasts with that of Habermas, another promi-
nent political philosopher for whom the dichotomy between moral
and legal human rights is inoperative.28 After all, interpersonal
obligations possessing moral attributes do not inevitably attain
the status of rights (as distinct from being ethically sound) in that
the latter typically require a deeper justification, or a second
source of normativity, due to the limitations they impose on indi-
vidual freedoms.29  Unlike the former, according to Habermas,
human rights are Janus-faced, embracing simultaneously moral-
ity and the law.  They are constructions, rather than moral truths
to be discovered, and as such have an inherently juridical charac-
ter, which entails a conceptual orientation toward a positive en-
actment by legislative bodies.
Hayward finds this position more compelling and proceeds to
endeavor to demonstrate that the right to an adequate environ-
25. Id.
26. See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RE-
SPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (Polity Press 2002).
27. See D.D. RAPHAEL, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Indiana Uni-
versity Press 2002) (1967).
28. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Polity Press 1997) (1996).
29. See JEREMY WALDRON, THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Oxford University Press 1984).
11
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ment satisfies both the moral and institutional/legal criteria com-
monly employed in assessing the genuineness of human rights.30
In terms of the moral yardsticks, he aims to establish that envi-
ronmental harms pose a serious threat to vital human interests on
a scale that is comparable to, or at times even greater than, that
seen in the case of many well-entrenched human rights.31 Hay-
ward also seeks to show that the right to an adequate environ-
ment qualifies as a truly universal right in the sense that the
interests it is designed to protect are common to all humans.
Again, it is said to fare as well in this respect, possibly better,
than several long-existing human rights.32
The legal hurdle is potentially crossed by identifying a series
of authoritative international documents lending substance to the
idea of environmental human rights, starting with the 1972 Stock-
holm Declaration adopted at the UN Conference on the Human
Environment.  Although this particular instrument was a legally
non-binding statement, an observation which applies to some of
those that have subsequently followed, it encapsulated the emerg-
ing consensus regarding the human rights underpinnings of envi-
ronmental protection.  The 1987 Brundtland Report has provided
further impetus to this process of status enhancement, and the
views to which it has given rise have been incorporated in a host of
constitutional and international vehicles (e.g., the 1989 UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child and the 1998 Aarhus Conven-
tion on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters).  Hay-
ward concedes that progress has been uneven, with setbacks along
the way (e.g., the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, to all intents and purposes a successor to the Stockholm
Declaration, eschewed the terminology of rights), but he asserts
that, on balance, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that envi-
ronmental human rights are crystallizing in international law.33
Having constructed an apparently sound analytical basis for
infusing environmental protection with human rights content,
Hayward moves on to grapple with the principal item on his chal-
lenging agenda: to impress upon his readers the logic and impor-
tance of constitutionalizing the right to an adequate environment.
30. See RAPHAEL, supra note 27.
31. See James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical
Perspectives on its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 281-295 (1993).
32. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 47-54.
33. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 47-54.
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The conceptual road he travels to this end features an argument
that there is no justification for drawing a meaningful distinction
between this specific right and those which form the core set in-
cluded as fundamental rights in virtually every modern constitu-
tion (i.e., the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to be presumed innocent,
the right to privacy, freedom of movement, the right to property,
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of assembly and association, and the right to partici-
pate in government).34
A counterclaim might conceivably be put forward that certain
human rights, firmly anchored in lofty ethical principles and by no
means lacking international legal recognition, are not denied con-
stitutional standing but are accorded lower status, and conse-
quently lesser binding force, than those comprising the core.  For
constitutional purposes, this category is classified as social rights,
in order to differentiate them from their fundamental counter-
parts.  In theory, the right to an adequate environment could be
placed in the lower-level set, for it displays a number of broadly
similar characteristics.  Be that as it may, Hayward contends that
pursuing this angle would not be fruitful since fundamental and
social rights are not mutually exclusive and the whole distinction
is of dubious value.35
Another argument potentially detracting from the thesis is
that environmental rights are best expressed as procedural enti-
tlements rather than as substantive edicts directed at securing an
adequate environment.  If this line of reasoning is valid, environ-
mental rights are effectively reduced to participatory rights which
formally empower citizens to demand access to information per-
taining to the environment, to provide an input into relevant deci-
sion-making processes, and seek appropriate redress through
judicial channels. Hayward rejects this notion on the grounds that
participatory rights, or the procedures through which they are re-
alized, assume determinate substantive commitments on the part
of the state.  The corollary is that procedural and substantive en-
vironmental rights stand or fall together and, to reiterate, he
34. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 62-92; see also PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH THE BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Philip Alston ed., Oxford
University Press 2000).
35. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 62-92.
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harbors no doubts about their fundamental constitutional
credentials.36
Establishing such credentials is merely part of the challenge.
An ecologically enlightened constitutional blueprint is no guaran-
tee of strict implementation and enforcement.  The potential diffi-
culties encountered in this context stem from the problems
inherent in converting a principle, however noble, into a dependa-
ble legal vehicle that citizens can employ in concrete judicial set-
tings. It is not necessarily a straightforward undertaking to make
an environmental right justiciable, or to present an admissible
case on its basis.  Even where this hurdle can be overcome, the
peculiar nature of environmental issues may render a successful
outcome a low-probability event.  While acknowledging such con-
cerns, Hayward does not consider the misgivings offered on that
score to be sufficient to abandon his mission, provided the right
steps are taken to avert mismanagement (e.g., improving citizens’
access to justice, furnishing the courts with the requisite constitu-
tional and organizational competence, and establishing specialist
environmental courts, if circumstances so dictate).37
To complicate matters, implementation and enforcement have
an international dimension.  Unfortunately, at this point, Hay-
ward’s bold and illuminating journey reaches a destination akin in
some respects to a cul de sac.  On the one hand, he assumes, im-
plicitly at least, that there is a single ethical code comfortably
shared by humankind, cultural barriers notwithstanding.  This
common moral fabric presumably underpins the human rights su-
perstructure, including the emerging environmental component,
which is being painstakingly constructed in order to forge a more
enlightened political regime across the globe.  On the other hand,
he cannot escape the reality of a world deeply fragmented along
socio-economic lines.  Implementation and enforcement, and often
underlying values, are a different proposition when ideas confront
practice in countries on the global periphery (as currently per-
ceived), particularly those in the early stages of development.
Given such tension, Hayward finds it convenient to largely confine
his thesis to mature democracies (mostly ones of a European vin-
tage), but attempts not to altogether surrender claims to universal
validity by offering lip service to the need for less affluent coun-
tries to address ecological threats head-on, despite the strains the
36. Id.
37. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 93-128.
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process is bound to trigger.  From a utilitarian perspective, he also
sees no reason for them to oppose the constitutionalization of envi-
ronmental rights in industrialized societies.38
The belated recognition of cultural diversity is a welcome shift
in a powerful argument that evolves in an overly linear fashion.
Even in mature democracies, intellectual predispositions and in-
stitutional dynamics at times follow divergent patterns (not al-
ways consistent with ecocentric/ biocentric/ deep ecology values).
Elsewhere, relative deprivation, resource scarcity, traditional in-
fluences, and transitional pressures may combine to create a com-
plex mosaic that must be carefully examined in an effort to distill
the relevant lessons and embrace the task of progressive environ-
mental design from a broader perspective. This does not imply a
jettisoning of universalism in favor of relativism, but an incorpo-
ration of elements derived from the latter into ecological diagno-
sis, prognosis, and prescription.
RELATIVISM REVISITED
Proponents of environmental human rights go to great
lengths to demonstrate that the preservation of the biosphere pos-
sesses moral and legal underpinnings equal to those of the protec-
tions granted through institutionally better entrenched human
rights. The impression inadvertently conveyed is that outside the
ecological domain norms have crystallized to a point whereby they
are no longer seriously challenged and that friction encountered in
the course of implementation/enforcement is not an impediment to
an effective functioning of the much-vaunted human rights re-
gime.  This is not an entirely accurate portrayal of developments
in the field for, although the environmental movement cannot
claim the international legal and constitutional achievements of
its human rights counterpart, the latter continues to confront
headwinds stemming from the plurality of socio-economic exper-
iences and political interests in the global arena.
The prevailing circumstances are selectively reflected in
human rights discourse, which at times assumes a ‘center-versus-
periphery’ character.  The center is more inclined to embrace the
existing human rights framework and adhere to it. The periphery
is less favorably disposed toward the system and has fewer mis-
givings about deviating from the spirit which it embodies. This
should not be invariably attributed to opportunistic motives, or
38. HAYWARD, supra note 10, at 185-215.
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even socio-economic inertia, because the human rights regime is
apparently not devoid of dualistic attributes that may partly ac-
count for the ambivalence.  After all, given the historical back-
drop, its evolution has inevitably been shaped by cultural
impulses originating at the center.  These impulses have been
marginally adjusted through a process of negotiations on a wider
international basis, yet Western/Northern influences have re-
mained the dominant force from conception to implementation
and enforcement.39
In light of such dualistic propensities, or perceived inequities,
political and intellectual elites at the periphery have tended to
tread unevenly on the human rights front.  The realities of West-
ern/Northern hegemony, coupled with a deep-rooted sense of inef-
ficacy, have often prompted them to adopt a critical attitude and
engage in various forms of resistance.  This has not always mani-
fested itself constructively due to the lingering residue of antago-
nism fueled by a long period of dependency and the fragility of
post-colonial domestic institutions.  There have thus been very
limited efforts to articulate indigenous ideas and undertake pro-
ductive bridge-building activities vis-a`-vis the center.  As a result,
the dualistic quality of the human rights framework has not mate-
rially diminished.40
The picture is not uniformly bifurcated.  Notably, some schol-
ars have consistently endeavored to narrow the gap between the
center and periphery by seeking ways to promote internal cultural
re-appraisal and cross-cultural dialogue.  The purpose of the for-
mer is to enhance the understanding of the culture-specific as-
sumptions underlying competing human rights perspectives.  The
latter is expected to build on this foundation by fostering ex-
changes conducive to viable normative synthesis.  Those involved
in the quest for greater consensus acknowledge the real or appar-
ent cultural insufficiency of certain human rights principles, but
39. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSEN-
SUS (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1992); HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL DIVERSITY (Peter Jones & Simon Caney eds., Cass
2001); HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, AND CONTINGENCIES (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., University of Michigan Press 2001); CHRIS BROWN, SOVER-
EIGNTY, RIGHTS, AND JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 187-211
(Cambridge 2002); CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (Abdul-
lahi A. An-Na’im ed., Zed Press 2002); HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY: AREA STUDIES
REVISITED (David P. Forsythe & Patrice C. McMahon eds., University of Nebraska
Press 2003).
40. See supra note 39.
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they proceed from the position that the current system is basically
sound and that it is not entirely oblivious to conceptions of human
rights advanced at the periphery (which are often skewed toward
the community rather than the individual).  In that vein, no radi-
cal overhaul is called for, as the two-step strategy advocated,
amounting to retroactive legitimization, may restore harmony
through internal/mutual learning and modest reformulations and
revisions of established human rights standards.41
This approach is marked by an acceptance of ethnocentricity,
albeit of the enlightened variety.  The thesis adopted is that, in its
progressive manifestations, an appreciation of one’s own group’s
uniqueness is likely to inspire respect for the uniqueness of other
groups.  Enlightened ethnocentricity hence recognizes the right of
others to be different, whether as individuals within the same so-
ciety or members of another society.  In sociological vernacular,
such a theoretical/policy orientation is generally identified with
cultural relativism, or the reaffirmation of the equal validity of
diverse patterns of life.  Its enlightened status notwithstanding,
this particular viewpoint is not unambiguously embraced at the
center, however, and it tends to be interpreted in a one-sided fash-
ion at the periphery, where the inclination is to emphasize local
cultural context and minimize the relevance of the external (i.e.
global/Western/Northern) dimension.42
Critics at the center retort that cultural relativism renders
moral judgement void and thereby impedes action against injus-
tice.  Even those who stop short of such absolutist observations
assert that the idea of human rights is anchored in modern con-
ceptions of fairness in organized societies rather than in anthropo-
logically-rooted consensus regarding the desires, needs, and
values of human beings.  The corollary is that Western/Northern
notions of social justice, while not universal in origin, ought to be
assessed on their merit and, if appropriate, should be considered
universally applicable. There may well be an inherent tension be-
tween human/ individual and collective rights, since the latter
give precedence to collective entities (family, community, nation,
etc.), but it does not necessarily follow that a dilution of the former
is the logical outcome.43
For the most part, such arguments fail to reverberate at the
periphery.  Eastern/ Southern relativists dismiss charges of nihil-
41. See supra note 39.
42. See supra note 39.
43. See supra note 39.
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ism on grounds of absolutist overstatement. They are also reluc-
tant to embrace values portrayed as universal but apparently
underpinned by exclusive ethnocentricity.  Morality to them may
be all-embracing, in the sense that no culture can escape it, yet
determining its content and supplying criteria for normative
judgement should not be the prerogative of one group or another.
In accordance with the spirit of cultural relativism, it is equally
vital to maintain that shared moral values be authentic rather
than imposed from outside. And, as matters stand, the existing
least common denominator may not be sufficiently broad to ac-
commodate all essential human rights.44
Indeed, cultural relativists have not confined themselves to
mere containment but have proceeded to construct an elaborate
analytical fac¸ade.  It now possesses a number of distinct dimen-
sions such as ethical relativism, epistemological relativism, his-
torical relativism, and linguistic relativism.  Each of these
branches, in turn, can be further subdivided into finer categories.
For example, ethical relativism, a particularly active stream, con-
sists of descriptive relativism, metaethical relativism, and norma-
tive relativism. The forces of divergence are counterbalanced by
influences fostering convergence, yet this rich mosaic clearly at-
tests to the lingering power of cultural relativism and the depths
of sentiment (as distinct from just entrenched interests) that sus-
tain it.45
Demographically formidable, economically resurgent, physi-
cally vast, and politically confident, Asia has spearheaded the
challenge to universalist visions of human rights.  Members of the
intellectual establishment and prominent officials in the region
have consistently underlined the particularistic nature of the
principles espoused by the center by portraying them as the prod-
uct of a specific genre of political thought originating in the En-
lightenment (i.e., in the modern West/North).  During that period,
rights had evolved from being perceived as grounded in natural
law bestowed by a divine lawgiver to assuming a democratic, egal-
itarian, individual, rational, secular, and (most importantly in
this context) supposedly universal character.46
44. See supra note 39.
45. See Roda Mushkat, Culture and International Law: Universalism v. Relativ-
ism, 6 SING. J. INT’L COMP. L. 1028, 1028-42 (2002).
46. See BROWN, supra note 39, at 187-211; HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (James T.H. Tang, ed., Pinter 1995); THE EAST ASIAN
CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanna R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell, eds., Cambridge
University Press 1999); DANIEL BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOC-
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Asian relativists view this ambitious normative framework as
geographically located and historically bound.  They assert that,
since it is rooted in a particular cultural tradition (Western/North-
ern liberalism, in all its elaborate forms), it cannot by definition be
promoted as all-embracing or, to express it differently, it fails on
its own terms.  To restate the point more emphatically, while
claiming universal validity, the framework is circumscribed by a
highly specific type of rationality. While advocating egalitarian-
ism, it deems other schools of thought and social practices unequal
(in fact, explicitly inferior); while extolling the virtues of freedom,
it effectively seeks to suppress alternative voices, notably those of
the non-liberal variety.47
Unlike in other parts of the periphery, the Asian posture vis-
a`-vis human rights standards emanating from the center is
marked by offensive muscle-flexing rather than merely defensive
containment. An unambiguously harsh critique of the West/North
is offered by some of the region’s most visible spokespersons focus-
ing on its seeming exploitation of human rights issues in the pur-
suit of an interventionist/neo-imperialist agenda, the rugged
individualism spawned by its liberal democratic ethos, and the
sense of moral vacuum engendered by its lack of an ethically-in-
spired collective purpose.  The selectively messianic orientation
leads to aggressive policies across borders and the adversarial/in-
dividualistic culture that has supplanted the feudal/patrimonial
order fosters conflict in both the institutional and private
domains.48
In the same vein, it is argued that, given its rich heritage and
socio-economic resilience, Asia may legitimately claim to be able
to furnish an alternative, perhaps even superior, mode of govern-
ance to the one promulgated at the center.  This model draws on a
variety of sources, including Confucianism, interpretations of Is-
lam enjoying currency in the region, and specific national/subna-
tional traditions whose influence continues to linger.  It is a tip of
a larger iceberg, consisting of a set of Asian values which perme-
ate every aspect of life. The model places authority and order
above democracy and individual freedom, duties above rights, eco-
RACY IN EAST ASIA (Princeton University Press 2000); ANTHONY J. LANGLOIS, THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTHEAST ASIA AND UNIVERSALIST THEORY
(Cambridge University Press 2001); DANIEL BELL, BEYOND DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL
THINKING FOR AN EAST ASIA CONTEXT 52-83 (Princeton University Press 2006).
47. See supra note 46.
48. See supra note 46.
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nomic and social advancement above civil and political matura-
tion, and the sovereign state above its citizens (or, for that matter,
any external parties).  Power, it should be noted, is not exercised
in a neutral fashion, as in the West/North, but in a morally correct
manner and in order to realize an ethically appealing vision.  The
government thus takes the form of a paternalistic trusteeship (or
soft authoritarianism), whereby people entrust their welfare to
the power-holders who exercise independent judgement in the
public interest.49
Committed universalists are not ruffled by such spirited on-
slaughts, even when the pressure is exerted by high-profile presi-
dents/prime ministers (notably those of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore at one juncture or another).  They contend that Asian
elites conveniently distort realities on both sides of the ideological
fence. Western/Northern liberalism is not devoid of a collective
spirit and Asian values do not consign individualism to moral ob-
livion.  By the same token, the former is not at all insensitive to
developmental needs which are accorded considerable importance,
albeit on a non-exclusive basis (i.e., economic and social rights co-
exist with civil and political ones, coalescing into a system whose
different parts reinforce each other).  Nor is its thrust inconsistent
with the effective discharge of sovereign functions.50
Moreover, pretensions notwithstanding, there is no single set
of Asian values and the region’s elites are opportunistically sin-
gling out those that serve their purposes, wrongly equating the
state with the community in the process.  The particular tenets
they choose to elevate are not necessarily supported by other seg-
ments of the population.  Indeed, Asian societies are fragmented
rather than merely diverse. Horizontal (inter-group) and vertical
(elite-mass) conflicts abound. It is thus disingenuous to juxtapose
the region’s putative harmony with the apparent fissures wit-
nessed at the liberal center.  If the Asian super order is in fact
underpinned by solid consensus, it may be appropriate to query
why the states in the region, including relatively affluent ones,
have to resort regularly and on a large scale to coercive measures
in their efforts to achieve national cohesion and political
stability.51
Unfortunately, this equally spirited counterattack, while not
without foundation, does not do full justice to the Asian values
49. See supra note 46.
50. See supra note 46.
51. See supra note 46.
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stance.  The multi-faceted nature of this complex phenomenon is
oversimplified because, in an adversarial climate, intellectual en-
ergy is directed almost exclusively toward vocal groups affiliated
with the official establishment.  It is true that Asian relativists
may blur the distinction between state and community, but global
universalists may overlook key cultural dimensions of the elite-
mass dichotomy. A more comprehensive examination of the re-
gion’s social scene reveals that, at the grassroots, there is no
dearth of coherent value sets which inspire constructions of
human rights that are scarcely consistent with those prevailing in
the West/North, and yet do not display the opportunistic edge of
official establishment ideologies.52
A close encounter with authentic Asian realities thus serves
to poignantly underline the geographically and historically contin-
gent character of human rights.  It prompts the observer to ac-
knowledge that they constitute intellectual frameworks developed
by one pivotal culture emerging from its own philosophical milieu
and are not necessarily applicable in a mechanical fashion to other
cultures.  Indeed, the possibility that the latter may act as a
source of valuable constructs should not be lightly dismissed.  This
does not imply that relativism in its unqualified form may be prof-
fered as a full-fledged alternative to classical universalism.
Rather, the corollary is that the two schools of thought cannot
evolve in isolation and that progress toward a culturally viable
human rights regime hinges on a genuine dialogue and mutual
learning.  Analytical devices proposed by legal scholars, such as
conversationalism and incompletely theorized agreements, may
facilitate productive interaction in this domain.53
The intellectual and political tension between universalism
and relativism manifests itself in the environmental arena, where
the two competing approaches vie for conceptual and strategic ad-
vantage with considerable intensity.  Proponents of the former put
forth sophisticated ethical and practical arguments couched in
52. See supra note 46.
53. See HABERMAS, supra note 28; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1733-72 (1995); SIMONE CHAMBERS, REASONABLE
DEMOCRACY: JURGEN HABERMAUS AND THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE (Cornell University
Press 1996); DELIBERATE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James
Bohman & William Regh, eds., MIT Press 1997); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon El-
ster, ed., Cambridge University Press 1998); AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Belknap Press 1998); FRANK FISCHER, REFRAMING
PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AND DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES (Oxford University
Press 2003).
21
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER104.txt unknown Seq: 22  6-MAR-09 13:09
140 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
terms of global ethics, human stewardship of nature, intergenera-
tional and intragenerational equity, common concern for man-
kind, human rights logic, implicit/explicit international
agreement/consensus, and sheer necessity.  Those who react to
such claims by adopting a relativist position follow an equally sub-
tle path, invoking notions of equity and justice, differential treat-
ment in international law, cultural legacy, institutional capacity,
and human constraints.54
As matters stand, the forces of convergence may be proving
somewhat stronger than those fostering divergence.  This reflects
the shift in a more democratic direction in Asia since the 1997/98
financial crisis, growing affluence seen in the region, socio-eco-
nomic transformation (rise of the middle class and emergence of
the service economy), value realignment, and increasing concerns
about relentless environmental degradation.  However, the gap
between ecological universalism and its relativist counterpart re-
mains substantial.  It can be narrowed further but not bridged en-
tirely because, again, meaningful uniformity and genuine
diversity cannot be wholly reconciled.  Although no radical conclu-
sions need to be drawn, the corollary inevitably is that environ-
mental enlightenment and protection should not be pursued in an
exclusively top-down fashion but be sought in parallel by means of
bottom-up strategies geared toward building an understanding of
complex realities and a viable ecological order through the exami-
nation of ground-level developments in different cultural set-
tings.55  From this perspective, the Chinese experience, distinctly
problematic in that context, may provide some lessons for scholars
and policy makers engaged in efforts to promote environmental
human rights.
HISTORICAL INSIGHTS
During the post-1978 reform era, Chinese society has been in
a state of profound transition, inexorably opening to the outside
world and consistently shedding its hard authoritarian features.
Nevertheless, despite occasional manifestations of an unadulter-
ated liberal spirit (expressing themselves in prominent dissident
statements employing analogies from physics to assert that there
is a single form of democracy invariably encompassing inviolable
54. See RODA MUSHKAT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASIAN VALUES:
LEGAL NORMS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES 25-31 (University of British Columbia Press
2004).
55. Id. at 16-31, 39-85, 127-130.
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freedoms),56 incorporating the China element into the global
human rights framework continues to pose a significant chal-
lenge.  The country is a participant in the system, but hardly an
earnest one, and its actions and official utterances at times border
on defiance/ resistance.57
More importantly, from a relativist standpoint, the largely in-
tact core of the evolving and progressively less monolithic Chinese
culture does not readily harmonize with the Western/Northern
liberal ethos underpinning the existing human rights regime.  No-
tably, this core is rooted in the assumption that individuals obtain
satisfaction mostly through their membership in an elaborate net-
work of social relationships, rather than principally in an entirely
autonomous fashion or in a manner involving themselves and a
higher authority on an exclusive basis.  The social relationships
are governed by a set of reciprocal but unequal expectations, such
as those between ruler and subject, that the parties are morally
bound to fulfill.58
This cultural legacy impinged on government functioning and
legal practices throughout the imperial era (221 B.C.-A.D. 1912).
Rather than being viewed as a state in the formal sense of the
term, the political institutions of the empire were essentially re-
garded, at least in principle, as an extended family.  Within that
culturally-shaped structure, the ruler, as a parent-like figure, had
fiduciary duties to insure the physical and spiritual well-being of
his subjects who, in turn, were to display loyalty and industry.
The law, which was to be resorted to only if more desirable instru-
ments of social control proved inadequate, dovetailed with the
family model by providing for differential punishments for hierar-
chically distinct social relationships.  As befits a family, there was
no effective recourse against a ruler failing, in the face of moral
suasion, to discharge his obligations.59
The painful encounter with post-Enlightenment Europe
brought into focus divergent conceptions of humanity and social
order.  The humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign powers/
“hairy barbarians” as a result of the defeat in the Opium War
56. See William P. Alford, Making a Goddess of Democracy from Loose Sand:
Thoughts on Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (James T.H. Tang, ed., Pinter 1995).
57. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR
MODEL FOR THE REST? (Oxford University Press 2007).
58. See supra note 56, at 69-73.
59. Id.
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(1839-1843), and the ensuing imposition of a system of extraterri-
toriality, shocked the intellectual elite into searching for new ways
to restore China’s independence and vigor.  This effort initially
centered on military means and technological sophistication, but
ultimately attention shifted to political and legal vitality.  Ideas
borrowed from foreign sources, notably those inspired by princi-
ples of representative government and equality before the law,
were tentatively floated and selectively transformed into program-
matic blueprints.60
However, such endeavors had a salient instrumental dimen-
sion in that they were driven by the perception that democracy
and the rule of law, rather than merely military prowess and tech-
nological ascendancy, played a crucial part in propelling the West/
North to a position of international dominance and that Chinese
strategies to redress the balance would have to be recalibrated ac-
cordingly.  The notions of representative government and equality
before the law were never stretched to their logical conclusion and
the culturally-resilient collective and hierarchical elements kept
on asserting themselves.  Even the much-vaunted pro-democracy
movement, which burst onto the political scene in the late 1980’s
and was brutally suppressed by the regime, did not carry the
human rights torch in a determined fashion and exhibited some
traditional orientations.61
Present-day China appears to be steadily evolving toward an
institutional configuration portrayed as “authoritarian plural-
ism.”  This is an intricate system within whose confines political
life remains under the unchallenged control of a deeply-en-
trenched single-party apparatus.  Strict limits are placed on lib-
erty (albeit with certain circumstantial variations) and national
security organs monitor socio-political trends closely.  Yet, at the
same time, a civil society is allowed to function apart from the
state.  The various segments of this body exercise a modicum of
autonomy and are thus able to reflect diverse interests.  By the




62. The analysis in the following three paragraphs was further explored in a pre-
viously published article co-authored with Miron Mushkat, citiations are included.
Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of Law,
and China’s Future, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 244 (2005).
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A key feature of this fluid institutional dynamics is a shift
from an uninhibited political center with transformative disposi-
tions toward an inhibited one with accommodative policies.  The
former constitutes the essence of a totalitarian state seeking to
morally purify the inner lives of its citizens.  The latter serves as a
pillar of an authoritarian regime to which Chinese people have
long been exposed.  It existed in Taiwan before, in markedly dif-
ferent circumstances (seriously limiting the scope for cultural ex-
trapolation), the democratization of the last two decades and
throughout China during many centuries of the imperial era.63
The inhibited center is organizationally incapable of effec-
tively directing the activities of citizens.  They regard it as
promulgating a fundamentally correct doctrine, which it cannot
implement successfully.  It thus enjoys a degree of fragmentary
legitimacy and operates in an ideologically eclectic manner.  The
ambiguities and contradictions which this peculiar pattern
spawns notwithstanding, it results in a reasonable measure of sta-
bility because of severe restrictions on what would normally qual-
ify as free political activity.  As matters stand, there is no evidence
to suggest that the Chinese ruling elite are pursuing a strategic
agenda whose ultimate aim is to convert the inhibited center into
a subordinate one, that is, an institution guided by the freely ex-
pressed will of the people/voters.64
Analogous influences manifest themselves in the legal do-
main.  It is apparent that China is undergoing a transition from a
system based on the rule of man to one displaying some semblance
to the rule of law.  Be that as it may, the emerging legal structure
is akin in many respects to a variant based on rule by law rather
than rule of law.  Although progress is doubtless being observed
on the legal front, the actual reach of the law does not extend very
far. After all, the Communist Party continues to function at vari-
ance with the constitution, other relevant legal documents, and
basic rule-of-law principles. Similarly, the government persists
with steps impeding civil society and political dissidents are com-
monly denied their legal rights.65
This authoritarian institutional milieu, while no longer bur-
dened by its previously hard attributes, scarcely provides a
favorable backdrop for contemplating, let alone, engineering, a
profound social transformation bound to culminate in the develop-
63. Id. at 243-44.
64. Id. at 244.
65. Id. at 250-54.
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ment of the kind of liberal order that Hancock deems essential for
fulfilling his progressive ecological vision.  Chinese political reali-
ties underline the geographically and historically narrow range of
a philosophically ambitious enterprise which seeks to refashion
the global political architecture by offering a standard critique of
modern capitalism and leaving untouched large swathes of the ge-
ographical and historical terrain. As an idealistic statement this is
potentially acceptable, but the programmatic content of the course
charted is simply inadequate.
Hayward does not set such demanding institutional require-
ments.  The realization of his environmental human rights
blueprint is not explicitly predicated on deep shifts in the socio-
economic fabric.  He nevertheless implies that an ecological leap
forward may not be possible in other than mature democratic set-
tings.  A two-pronged strategy is thus recommended: an imple-
mentation of an aggressive pro-environment agenda through
constitutional channels in the Western/Northern hemisphere (ef-
fectively Europe) and an adoption of a more constructive ecological
stance elsewhere. However, the suggestions for industrializing
countries, including those commonly singled out for their interna-
tional prominence (Brazil, Russia, India, and China; i.e., members
of the hypothetical ‘BRIC club’), are distinctly general in nature.
Davis has stepped into the analytical void by putting forth the
notion of constitutional indigenization.  He places an equally
strong emphasis on constitutional action/reinforcement but, un-
like Hayward, firmly believes that the dichotomy between mature
democracies and ones resting on more fragile foundations/authori-
tarian regimes should not be accorded undue importance.  The
overarching goal is to promote liberal democracy within a vibrant
constitutional framework and, at least at the theoretical level, no
special allowances need to be made for countries that opt to oper-
ate in a less enlightened fashion.  Constitutional indigenization
arguably furnishes a path toward this end because it aspires to
embed the principles of representative government and equality
before the law in local (i.e., culturally diverse) institutions.66
The assumption is that the essence of human rights as cur-
rently conceived can be grasped across the geographical spectrum,
if local cultural influences are allowed to come into play in an ap-
propriate manner.  Evidence in support of this claim is adduced by
66. Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over
Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998).
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drawing attention to Asian countries, notably Japan, which over a
long period of time have dismantled their authoritarian institu-
tions and have embraced liberal democracy and constitutionalism
(with “Asian characteristics”).67 However, this illuminating blend-
ing of descriptive and normative contentions does not amount to a
viable plan of action.  The structural changes advocated may be
desirable and ultimately feasible, but they provide no concrete ba-
sis for guiding China (an emerging superpower and a source of
ecological hazards on a global scale) in the coveted direction.
Soft authoritarianism and rule by law render the pursuit of
environmental human rights a highly challenging undertaking,
albeit not necessarily an unproductive one.  While this is a low-
probability scenario, a government disinclined to share power
widely and subject itself to elaborate legal constraints might con-
ceivably display marked ecological consciousness. By the same to-
ken, although this too is an unlikely prospect, a society long
accustomed to functioning within a tight collective and hierarchi-
cal straightjacket could potentially exhibit a similar orientation.
It thus behoves scholars engaged in a quest for robust legal means
to protect the biosphere to examine dimensions of Chinese culture
specifically related to the environment.
In this respect, a perusal of relevant historical and philosophi-
cal surveys might initially suggest that the picture is more palat-
able than one would be disposed to assume on the basis of current
attitudes and practices.  Indeed, there is an extensive academic
literature highlighting the ecologically progressive features of
Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism (the local variant), and Bud-
dhism.  At times, the impression conveyed is that, for the most
part, China has evolved in an environmentally far less threaten-
ing cultural milieu than countries whose populace has embraced
the monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) and
other civilizations that previously flourished in the West/North
(the Greeks and Romans were particularly known for their pro-
nounced anthropocentric beliefs).68
67. Id.
68. See CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA’S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHI-
NESE HISTORY AND CULTURE passim (Stanford University Press 1975); RICHARD L. ED-
MONDS, PATTERNS OF CHINA’S LOST HARMONY: A SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY’S
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PROTECTION 22-41 (Routledge 1994); Yu-shi Mao,
Evolution of Environmental Ethics: A Chinese Perspective, in ETHICS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 42-57 (1994); RICHARD G. BOTZLER & SUSAN
J. ARMSTRONG, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE 284-96 (Mc-
Graw-Hill 2003); SEDIMENTS OF TIME: ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY IN CHINESE HISTORY
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If this portrayal is read selectively, a tentative analogy might
be drawn with the cultural propensities of Native Americans (or,
for that matter, indigenous people in general), who are commonly
assumed to have endeavored to forge a perfectly harmonious rela-
tionship with nature (an apparently romanticized view categori-
cally rejected by some anthropologists/social historians).69  The
attitudinal patterns depicted most vividly point to a profound ap-
preciation of the intrinsic value of the non-human parts of the uni-
verse manifesting itself in a multifaceted fashion that would not
be inconsistent with avant-garde forms of present-day ecocentrism
(albeit along lines varying over time; e.g., actively in Confucian
thought but passively in its Taoist counterpart).70
However, an exploration of the fringes in the substantial
scholarly work on the subject leads to a more problematic conclu-
sion.  A generous interpretation of pertinent trends would suggest
that an originally enlightened belief system had undergone a sub-
sequent corrosion due to a confluence of exogenous pressures and
endogenous manipulation (by misguided and self-centered elites/
rulers).  Such reasoning would not be regarded as aberrant in this
context as an analogous approach is adopted by historians who
differentiate between (morally unalloyed) Confucianism and (mor-
ally flawed) Neo-Confucianism.71  A less sympathetic construction
would indicate that strong anthropocentric elements (predomi-
nantly, a Confucian desire to achieve mastery over nature) were a
constant factor in Chinese culture and that they have simply be-
come increasingly salient over time.72
A careful dissection of the body of historical materials availa-
ble lends credence to the latter position.  In fact, it seems that the
sound ecological principles espoused by culture shapers in the
early eras had always been confined to the social periphery and
passim (Mark Elvin & Liu Ts’ui-jung eds., Cambridge University Press 1998); CON-
FUCIANISM AND ECOLOGY: THE INTERRELATION OF HEAVEN, EARTH, AND HUMANS pas-
sim (Mary E. Tucker & John H. Berthrong eds., Harvard University Press 1998);
MARK ELVIN, THE RETREAT OF THE ELEPHANTS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF CHINA
(Yale University Press 2004).
69. BOTZLER & ARMSTRONG, supra note 68 (surveying divergent views).
70. See HUCKER, supra note 68, at 69-95; CONFUCIANISM AND ECOLOGY: THE INTER-
RELATION OF HEAVEN, EARTH, AND HUMANS, supra note 68.
71. See Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human
Rights and Asian Values, supra note 66; Tucker & Berthrong, CONFUCIANISM AND
ECOLOGY: THE INTERRELATION OF HEAVEN, EARTH, AND HUMANS, supra note 68;
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES passim (Michael C. Davis ed., Oxford University Press 1995).
72. See Elvin & Tsui-jung Liu, supra note 68, at 9-18, 454-71.
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had exerted a limited impact on daily lifestyles and government
policies.  Moreover, as Elvin has pointed out, the tenets advanced
had largely been the product of lagged responses to physically dis-
ruptive episodes rather than proactive ethical reflection.  Specifi-
cally, “[t]he restraint preached by the archaic environmental
wisdom found in certain Chinese classical texts is both familiar
and in all likelihood commonly misunderstood: it was probably not
a symptom of any ancient harmony but, rather, of a rational reac-
tion to an incipient but already visible ecological crisis.”73
Evidence that such philosophical musings made distinctly
modest inroads into the overall culture can be derived from
surveys conducted in recent years (i.e., a period characterized by
relative political openness and tolerance by Chinese historical
standards).  The data understandably leave something to be de-
sired in terms of quality and scope.  They nevertheless paint a pic-
ture that is unambiguous on the whole and marked by few
inconsistencies. There is sufficient empirical basis to infer that at
the grassroots level environmental degradation is not regarded as
a pressing issue, the problem is accorded a low priority (in general
and vis-a`-vis economic development in particular), familiarity
with ecological matters is inadequate (in both rural and urban ar-
eas), willingness to engage directly or indirectly in corrective ac-
tion is weak, and commitment to any remedial vision is tenuous.74
The exogenous pressures and endogenous manipulation
briefly referred to earlier merit additional consideration for they
shed further light on the analytical schemes put forth by contem-
porary proponents of environmental human rights (especially
Hancock).  A factor that looms large in the historical literature is
the endless quest for power by the state, or the elites/rulers con-
trolling or aspiring to control it, which time and again resulted in
a material transformation of the natural habitat for the purposes
of warfare.  The 248 years of the Warring States period, during
which 590 large-scale military conflicts were recorded, vividly ex-
emplify this phenomenon in that they featured an uncomfortably
73. Mark Elvin, The Environmental Legacy of Imperial China, 156 CHINA QUAR-
TERLY 733, 738-39 (1998).
74. See ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASES OF
CHINA AND THAILAND 46-168 (Sigeki Nisihira et al. eds., Institute of Developing Econ-
omies, 1997); Yoke-shiu F. Lee, Public Environmental Consciousness in China: Early
Empirical Evidence, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 35-65 (Kristen A. Day ed., M.E. Sharpe 2005).
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close relationship between the intensity of military campaigns
and severe ecological disruption.75
Paradoxically, post-war political realignment and physical re-
construction tended to aggravate, rather than ameliorate, envi-
ronmental conditions.  The victorious parties normally proceeded
to consolidate power and restore legitimacy by embarking on
large-scale projects with seriously adverse ecological conse-
quences.  The ambitious designs implemented by the first emperor
of the Qin dynasty were typical in this respect.  He is lauded by
scholars for successfully uniting six autonomous political entities
and establishing the first centralized state in Chinese history.
The task was facilitated by building a vast network of massive
canals and irrigation systems, which enhanced communication
across large territorial spaces and contributed to prosperity/stabil-
ity.  However, these efforts proved very costly in that they placed
an enormous burden on the biosphere (as well as the many people
affected and the social system).76
Imperial desire to boost the size of the population was another
element in this environmentally questionable strategic paradigm.
The underlying assumption was that the greater the number of
subjects the ruler has command over, the greater his economic/
military capabilities.  From a top-down perspective, people were
viewed as a source of agricultural labor, tax paying units, and
army recruits, or as a valuable resource which could be employed
as a quantitatively significant factor in aiding imperial entrench-
ment at home and in sustaining expansion beyond state borders.
Uncontrolled population growth (without due regard to con-
straints such as the amount of land available) thus emerged as a
perennial environmental challenge.  The Ming dynasty, whose
policies resulted in a near doubling of the population over two cen-
turies or so and hence widespread ecological devastation (defores-
tation, flooding, soil erosion, and so forth), provides a poignant
illustration of the decidedly negative impact on the biosphere of
narrowly-focused strategies consistently pursued in an unfettered
fashion by state authorities.77
75. See HUCKER, supra note 68, at 21-47; Mark Elvin, The Environmental Legacy
of Imperial China, supra note 73; Elvin & Tsui-jung Liu, supra note 68, at 86-114.
76. See QU GEPING & LI JINCHANG, POPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA
17 (Robert Boardman ed., Jiang Baozhong & Gu Ran trans., Lynn Rienner Publishers
1994).
77. See id. at 24-25.
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China’s rulers were also traditionally disinclined to methodi-
cally engage in institution building in general and in the environ-
mental domain in particular.  Rather, throughout the imperial era
and beyond (including Mao Zedong’s reign), they displayed a
strong preference for relying on moral suasion/personal authority.
Ecological regulations were seldom promulgated in a systematic
fashion and there were virtually no serious attempts to codify en-
vironmental laws. Ecological management mostly took the form of
periodic campaigns, featuring mass mobilization to furnish sup-
port for large-scale infrastructure projects, which wreaked havoc
on the biosphere.  The Qing dynasty was an exception to the his-
torical norm, but its efforts to build viable legal institutions fizzled
out following its demise.78
CONTEMPORARY INSIGHTS
This modus operandi was stretched to extraordinary extremes
by Mao Zedong, whose relentless pursuit of perpetual revolution
inflicted unthinkable damage on the socio-economic fac¸ade and
the environment.  His single-handedly instigated campaigns, such
as the anti-rightist drive and the Cultural Revolution, aimed at
eradicating pockets of revolutionary lethargy, and insatiable
quest for communist utopia, culminating in the Great Leap For-
ward, left China’s institutions and its ecosystem in shambles.79
Limited resistance had traditionally been offered to such arbitrary
and harmful patterns of state action because of cultural and politi-
cal influences (Confucian-style deference, impediments to scien-
tific rationalism, and Marxist-Leninist dogma), rather than
merely due to immense power imbalances and unsparing use of
coercive means.80
As matters stand, reform era dynamics does not necessarily
constitute a sharp break from the traditional model of state
78. See Helen Dunstan, Official Thinking on Environmental Issues and the State’s
Environmental Roles in Eighteenth-Century China, in SEDIMENTS OF TIME: ENVIRON-
MENT AND SOCIETY IN CHINESE HISTORY 585-614 (1998); CIVIL LAW IN QING AND RE-
PUBLICAN CHINA passim (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C. C. Huang eds., Stanford
University Press 1999).
79. MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT passim (Richard L. Edmonds ed., Ox-
ford University Press 2000); JUDITH SHAPIRO, MAO’S WAR AGAINST NATURE: POLITICS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA passim (Cambridge University
Press 2001); ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 47-55 (Cornell University Press 2004); see Day, supra
note 74.
80. See Alford, supra note 56; 2 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN
CHINA passim (Cambridge University Press 1956).
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[over]drive and containment.  Broad similarities may be discerned
with periods of post-conflict (principally of a military character in
the distant past, but of a socio-political nature in recent decades)
consolidation and reconstruction.  The strategic emphasis has no-
tably shifted from class struggle and ideological purification to-
ward national reconciliation and enhancement of production/
improvement in the standard of living.  Concrete steps have been
taken, at times involving complex maneuvers and substantial
pressures, to reduce elite fragmentation, heighten policy consen-
sus, routinize decision-making procedures, increase organiza-
tional effectiveness, stabilize grassroots sentiment, rebuild the
physical infrastructure, and revitalize the economy.81
However, such potentially complementary and mutually-rein-
forcing goals have been pursued in an unsynchronized and uneven
fashion.  Preservation of Communist Party rule and economic
growth has been accorded foremost priority and other goals have
been relegated to the periphery and implemented in a haphazard
manner.  Expansion of the economy has been pursued in a partic-
ularly relentless and single-minded style, crowding out the re-
maining parts of the reform agenda. The concerted effort directed
toward this end and determination displayed in the process have
reflected the belief that rising prosperity tends to keep core strata
of society content and foster a climate supportive of fundamental
reconstruction.82 Specifically, it helps to achieve an objective that,
according to Hirschman, has often eluded reformers – namely,
turning a complex game that is inherently redistributive into one
in which everyone wins, or at least no one is worse off than before
the shift in the status quo.83
The building of socio-political infrastructure has been a decid-
edly more muted affair.  In fact, China has lagged the Soviet
Union in granting institutions, as distinct from (warring) person-
81. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA:
LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES (Princeton University Press 1988); KENNETH
G. LIEBERTHAL & DAVID M. LAMPTON, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING
IN POST-MAO CHINA (University of California Press 1992); SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLIT-
ICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (University of California Press 1993);
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION
(Pearson Longman 2006); KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLU-
TION THROUGH REFORM (W. W. Norton 2004); TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS
OF CHINA (Palgrave Macmillan 2004).
82. See SHIRK, supra note 81, at 3-22; LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, supra note 81, at 245-72.
83. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11-24
(Yale University Press 1958).
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alities, the authority to set strategy.  It was, after all, a newer and
less prominent member of the communist fraternity.  Its evolution
from a personalized rule to an institutionalized one was impeded
by Mao’s use of mass campaigns to prevent the routinization of the
revolution.  The authority of the Soviet Central Committee to
choose party leaders was established definitely in 1957.  By con-
trast, its Chinese equivalent had to share power with party elders
who did not hold any official posts throughout the last two decades
of the 20th century and possibly beyond.84
As Lee, Mann, Pei, and Shirk suggest in their recent and illu-
minating work, economic reform may be akin to Pandora’s box,
unleashing powerful centrifugal forces which promote affluence,
and hence serve as an insurance policy, but which the ruling elite
struggles to control. Propelling the economy inexorably forward is
thus both an imperative and a risky strategy.  Party leaders walk
the proverbial tightrope by pushing hard on the economic acceler-
ator while at the same time proceeding at a snail’s pace on the
socio-political front. The upshot is that massive resources are
channeled toward physical reconstruction (as well as national se-
curity), yet the institutions which sustain this vast undertaking
remain in their embryonic stage, detracting from the effectiveness
of the enterprise and rendering it a precariously delicate balanc-
ing act.85
The imbalance between a runaway economy and a stagnant
socio-political system/policy apparatus is merely one of several
marring the strategic landscape.  Notably, the education, health,
and welfare sectors are grossly underdeveloped, starved of funds,
and lacking innovative impetus.  The economic engine itself oper-
ates on an uneven keel. A policy of ‘unbalanced growth’ is pursued
with an unrestrained devotion. Robust output expansion takes
84. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 81, at 35-62; Kenneth G. Lieber-
thal, Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and its Limitations, in
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1-30 (1992); Carol
Lee Hamrin, The Party Leadership System, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION
MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 95-124 (Lieberthal & Lampton eds., University of Cali-
fornia Press 1992); SHIRK, supra note 81, at 3-22; DREYER, supra note 81, at 107-40;
LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, supra note 81,
at 59-122; SAICH, supra note 81, at 25-56.
85. MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AU-
TOCRACY (Harvard University Press 2006); JOHN LEE, WILL CHINA FAIL? THE LIMITS
AND CONTRADICTIONS OF MARKET SOCIALISM (Centre for Independent Studies 2007);
JAMES MANN, THE CHINA FANTASY: HOW OUR LEADERS EXPLAIN AWAY CHINESE RE-
PRESSION (Viking 2007); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (Oxford Unier-
sity Press 2007).
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precedence over price stability.  Exports, foreign capital inflows,
and fixed asset investment are unceasingly stimulated, but do-
mestic consumption is to all intents and purposes suppressed.
Some provinces boom, others languish. The economy is highly
prone to overheating and periodically needs to be subjected to
“cooling-off therapy.”86
The predicament facing the ruling elite, deliberate choices
made in the course of strategy formulation, a legacy of societal
mismanagement, and fragility of public institutions account for
such imbalances.  The problem is compounded by vertical frag-
mentation which undermines policy coordination.  This is largely
a product of Mao’s onslaughts on the central bureaucracy.  In two
key mass campaigns, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution, the founder of the People’s Republic sought to acceler-
ate economic growth in the face of stubborn opposition from status
quo-oriented officials in Beijing.  He embraced a tactic of ‘playing
to the provinces,’ or mobilizing provincial support as a counter-
weight to the center.  Mao appealed to leaders at the subnational
level by delegating power to them and by coopting them into top
decision-making bodies.87
During each of the campaigns, the macro and microeconomic
management apparatus was significantly flattened, and authority
and instruments of power were dramatically shifted from the capi-
tal to the provinces.  The Cultural Revolution was marked by an
almost total collapse of the traditional state organs in the wake of
sending down a substantial number of central government bu-
reaucrats to the countryside for the purpose of revitalizing their
fading ideological beliefs through hard manual work.  In the after-
math of campaigns, both of which were ultimately deemed to be
86. See DREYER, supra note 81, at 219-64; SAICH, supra note 81, at 268-304;
CHINA’S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT passim (David S.G. Goodman ed., Routledge 1989);
SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA passim (Linda Wong &
Stewart MacPherson eds., Ahgate 1995); WANG SHAOGUANG & HU ANGANG, THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF CHINA passim (M.E. Sharpe
1999); YEHUA DENNIS WEI, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: STATES, GLOBALIZA-
TION, AND INEQUIALITY passim (Routledge 2000); GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COL-
LAPSE OF CHINA passim (Random House 2001); JOHN B. STARR, UNDERSTANDING
CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA’S ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE passim
(Hill & Wang 1997); SOCIAL POLICY REFORM IN CHINA: VIEWS FROM HOME AND ABROAD
passim (Catherine Jones Finer ed., Ashgate Publishing 2003); JOE STUDWELL, THE
CHINA DREAM: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR THE LAST GREAT UNTAPPED MARKET ON EARTH
passim (Profile Books 2003).
87. SHIRK, supra note 81, at 149-96; DREYER, supra note 81, at 81-106; LIEBER-
THAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, supra note 81, at 59-
122; SAICH, supra note 81, at 25-56.
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an unmitigated failure, Beijing reclaimed some but not all of the
controls it previously surrendered.88
Indeed, Mao’s successor as paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping,
was partly inspired by his predecessor’s historical example, even
though he was driven by a fundamentally different strategic vi-
sion.  Deng consistently promoted market reform by playing to the
provinces in a broadly similar fashion, an option which, for in-
stance, was not available to the centrally-constrained Gorbachev
in generally equivalent circumstances.  Under his tutelage, local
officials became the quantitatively dominant bloc in the Central
Committee during the reform era, and a radical decentralization
of the fiscal system (a crucial source of political power) was carried
out at the early stages of the post-1978 restructuring process.89
Underdeveloped socio-political institutions and vertical frag-
mentation have impeded effective management across the strat-
egy spectrum throughout the reform era, rather than merely the
years spanning Mao’s cataclysmic policy experiments. The trans-
formation of the economy and its Asian Tiger-like performance in
the past three decades is often portrayed as a “miracle.”  If so, “of-
ficial wisdom” may have not been the sole, or even decisive, factor
responsible for this outcome. Some critical steps seemingly taken
to revive the ossified structure, particularly during the early
stages of dismantling barriers to rapid expansion of production,
may have been the result of poorly thought-out measures put in
place (in some respects, Mao-style) by a single leader, or a coterie
of politically influential figures, which somehow (‘miraculously,’ to
paraphrase mainstream commentators) did not cause serious so-
cial rupture.  The economic dynamism witnessed in the past three
88. DREYER, supra note 81, at 107-40; LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, supra note 81, at 59-122; SAICH, supra note 81, at 25-
179.
89. LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 81, at 13-168, 339-90; Susan L. Shirk,
The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform, in BU-
REAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 82-86 (Kenneth G.
Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., University of California Press 1992); Paul E.
Schroeder, Territorial Actors and Competitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wu-
han, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 283-307
(1992); Andrew G. Walder, Local Bargaining Relationships and Urban Industrial Fi-
nance, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 308-33
(1992); SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, supra note 81, at
149-96; DREYER, supra note 81, at 107-140; LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM supra note 81, at 123-242; SAICH, supra note 81, at 57-
90, 155-79.
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decades may reflect to a greater extent successful private initia-
tive than enlightened public guidance.90
A number of pivotal decision rules have been introduced by
senior party leaders in order to counter erratic actions and atomi-
zation of the organizational apparatus, as well as to further ra-
tionalize and stabilize strategy formulation procedures.
Delegation by consensus is a notable example.  The Communist
Party thus delegates to the State Council the authority to under-
take specific policy commitments.  Key members of the latter, in
turn, delegate to their subordinates the authority to make deci-
sions if the agents agree.  If the agents are capable of reaching a
consensus, the decision is automatically ratified by the higher
level.  If the agents fail to agree, the principals step in to provide
direction.  Alternatively, the issue is temporarily shelved or aban-
doned altogether.  Delegation by consensus is expected to be prac-
tised throughout the party-state institutional network.91
Another procedural norm which currently needs to be closely
adhered to by policy makers is incrementalism.  The pace of re-
form ought to be moderate and socio-economic change should be
pursued in a piecemeal fashion. Radical transformation of the en-
tire system and the major components thereof is to be avoided.
Sequencing of far-reaching departures from the status quo, prefer-
ably methodical in nature, is also favored because it minimizes the
risks of costly blunders, and renders a backlash from potentially
disaffected constituencies a less likely prospect.92  Such decision
rules seem to have taken a firmer hold under the premiership of
Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) and have become increasingly entrenched
since the retirement (in 2004) of President Jiang Zemin, Deng
90. See CHANG, supra note 86, at 144-65; STUDWELL, supra note 86, at 219-44;
JIANRONG HUANG, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINA’S REJUVENATION 21-40, 75-82 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2004).
91. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 81, at 135-168; Lieberthal, Intro-
duction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and its Limitations, supra note
84;  David L. Lampton, A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic
Politics in China, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST - MAO
CHINA 33, 33-58 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., University of Cali-
fornia Press 1992); Shirk, The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of
Economic Reform, supra note 89, at 68-81; SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA, supra note 81, at 116-28, 245-79; LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA:
FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM, supra note 81, at 171-242; SAICH, supra note 81,
at 121-79; JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC RE-
FORM 44-67 (Thomson South-Western 2005).
92. See SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, supra note
81, at 129-45; LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM,
supra note 81, at 245-72; SAICH, supra note 81, at 233-67; WU, supra note 91, at 57-74.
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Xiaoping’s successor.93 In this case, persistent economic liberaliza-
tion and procedural (as well as substantive) rationality may there-
fore be intertwined.
The overall patterns outlined above have plainly manifested
themselves in the environmental domain.  The economy has
loomed large on the government agenda and has expanded by
leaps and bounds, whereas the ecosystem has for the most part
remained in the strategic shadows and has suffered marked dete-
rioration.  Institutional capabilities to offset the imbalances have
been slow to develop, high-quality remedial programs have been
few and far between, and policy coherence has been distinctly low.
The biosphere has borne the consequences, as evidenced by a
plethora of potentially intractable problems such as large-scale
desertification, rapidly dwindling forest resources, serious flood-
ing, excessive population growth, and worrisome water scarcity.94
The pre-reform era leadership cannot be absolved of heavy re-
sponsibility for this state of affairs.  From an analytical perspec-
tive, it is appropriate in this context to examine the period since
the Communist Revolution in its entirety, treating respectively
the Mao-dominated (other than very briefly) and subsequent
phases as the equivalent of the recurring conflict-driven and post-
conflict historical episodes. Mao’s grand vision for China as a
great power ushered in shortly following the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic the typical cycle of ill-thought-out mobilization of
resources to wage war, ambitious schemes geared toward eco-
nomic aggrandizement, and questionable plans to boost the size of
the population.  The impact on the environment of this familiar
strategic-mix was unambiguously severe.95
In 1958, Mao’s unshakeable belief in man’s capacity to freely
reshape the material world and his desire to transform China into
a leading player in the global arena prompted him to launch the
Great Leap forward, a colossal mass-mobilization campaign to cat-
apult the country into the advanced stages of communism and
overtake the most prosperous capitalist nations.  Mammoth land
reclamation projects were undertaken to stimulate grain produc-
93. See WILLY WO-LAP LAM, THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN (Prentice Hall 1999); LAU-
RENCE J. BRAHM, ZHU RONGJI AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN CHINA (John Wi-
ley & Sons 2002); WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: NEW
LEADERS, NEW CHALLENGES (M.E. Sharpe 2006).
94. See EDMONDS, PATTERNS OF CHINA’S LOST HARMONY A SURVEY OF THE COUN-
TRY’S ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PROTECTION, supra note 68, at 22-41; SHA-
PIRO, supra note 79; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 47-55.
95. See supra note 94.
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tion, laying waste to forests, lakes, rivers, and wetlands.  Vast in-
vestment in agricultural infrastructure ensued in a haphazard
fashion (many of the dams, irrigation facilities, and reservoirs con-
structed at substantial economic and human cost soon dis-
integrated), leading to forced migration on a painfully large scale.
The effort directed toward manufacturing iron and steel in backy-
ard furnaces, in order to surpass the United States, resulted in
huge stockpiles of useless metal and escalating pollution levels.96
Bureaucratic endeavors to address the widespread devasta-
tion wrought by this ill-thought social experiment barely assumed
concrete form before, merely five years after it was brought to an
abrupt end in 1961, Mao launched an even more ambitious cam-
paign to purge the party and state apparatuses of ‘capitalists
roaders’ pursuing ‘bourgeois’-style agendas, empower the masses,
create bottom-up power structures, and rekindle fading ideological
fervor.  The Cultural Revolution saw a renewed preoccupation
with grain production to the serious detriment of animal hus-
bandry, fisheries, and forestry.  Industrial production objectives
were couched in exclusively quantitative terms with no attention
paid to appropriate technologies.  Energy and raw materials were
treated as non-scarce goods.  Environmental (as well as labor) reg-
ulations were summarily rescinded, giving rise to sharp increases
in air and water pollution along with significant loss of biodivers-
ity.  The apprehensive ‘third front’ policy, featuring a shift of man-
ufacturing facilities from coastal regions vulnerable to foreign
attacks to remote inland areas, greatly compounded the problem
(since factories located near caves were spewing toxic discharge in
the surrounding mountains).97
Mao’s China – and, for that matter, its Republican predeces-
sor – inherited from previous regimes a highly rudimentary insti-
tutional infrastructure to address ecological challenges.
Throughout the country’s history, the responsibility for managing
the complex relationship between man and nature had not been
vested in effective organizational vehicles but in a loose network
of individual officials consisting primarily of the emperor or
equivalent (enjoying a virtually unlimited “mandate from
heaven”) and a coterie of regional administrators.  Environmental
protection thus had heavily depended on personal leanings of a
96. See supra note 94.
97. See supra note 94.
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handful of strategically-placed and practically unconstrained
players.98
The inherent flaws of this individualistic system of ecological
governance were aggravated by a weak tradition of codification
and enforcement of environmental laws, coupled with a preference
for ad hoc campaign-style mass mobilizations.  A mixture of Con-
fucian ideals and Legalist principles underpinned the authority of
local magistrates to balance competing interests on a case-by-case
basis without reference to a set of codified laws.  This, in turn,
enhanced the scope for discretionary action on the part of the em-
peror, or emperor-like ruler, and local officials, for whom ecologi-
cal preservation generally was a low priority item.  Institutions
dedicated to the enforcement of codified law never evolved beyond
the embryonic stage and rampant corruption undermined their
operational efficiency.  Mao’s harsh onslaught on the vestiges of
perceived bureaucratic power led to a total collapse of this fragile
organizational fac¸ade.99
The reform era has witnessed a dramatic economic revival,
seemingly against all odds, as a combination of top-down initia-
tives and bottom-up entrepreneurial vigor (the perhaps more cru-
cial role played by the latter in the modernization process is not
always duly acknowledged) has unleashed a wave of business ac-
tivities that have propelled the initially moribund economy relent-
lessly forward for three decades.  Growing affluence, coupled with
a shift from hard to soft authoritarianism, has also resulted in a
marked de-escalation of social tensions, although large-scale ru-
ral-urban migration has been accompanied by the emergence of
new type of strains in the household sector.  By contrast, socio-
economic liberalization has brought no tangible relief on the envi-
ronmental front.
Near double-digit, or often faster, output expansion has sub-
stantially boosted demand for resources such as energy, land, and
water.  An insatiable appetite for energy by industry, a problem
exacerbated by an excessive reliance on coal to satisfy it, has
driven up air pollution in cities to levels rarely observed in other
countries.  This is a principal source of pulmonary and respiratory
diseases.  Another by-product (i.e., in addition to ultra particu-
98. See HUCKER, supra note 68, at 48-68, 149-69, 303-28; Mark Elvin, The Envi-
ronmental Legacy of Imperial China, supra note 73, at 413-53; Dunstan, supra note
78, at 585-614;  ELVIN, THE RETREAT OF THE ELEPHANTS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY
OF CHINA supra note 68, at 86-114; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 27-57.
99. See supra note 98.
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lates) is acid rain, again the magnitudes defy comparison, which
does not merely damage human health but has a deleterious effect
on supporting parts of the ecosystem as well (crippling forests,
damaging cropland, destroying wildlife, eroding buildings, and
poisoning fish throughout China).100
Reform-inspired demand, within a loose regulatory frame-
work, has wreaked havoc on the country’s forests.  An inexorable
quest for timber has lifted logging to unsustainable highs in a
physical setting where centuries of pressures originating in the
agricultural and military domains had already reduced per capita
forest reserves to painfully low levels, rendering this segment of
the environment ill-equipped to cope with the extra burden.  The
losses suffered by grasslands have been broadly similar.  In that
case, the ravage caused has largely stemmed from persistent ef-
forts to boost grain production, featuring a conversion to irrigated
crop cultivation (which brings about severe degradation).  Further
harm has been the consequence of intensive grazing methods, new
techniques for growing fodder and forage, and privatization of
herds and grazing land.101
Shrinking water supply and deteriorating water quality has
proved to be an equally acute challenge.  Demand for the resource
from agricultural, industrial, and residential users has grown by
leaps and bounds, measures to dampen it have been half-hearted,
supply-side initiatives have fallen short of need, and recurring
droughts have accelerated the process of depletion.  Escalating
water pollution has greatly worsened the picture and periodically-
100. See EDMONDS, supra note 68, at 158-192; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 59-90;
Vaclav Smil, China’s Energy Resource Uses: Continuity and Change, in MANAGING
THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT 211, 211-27 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed., Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2000); Edward B. Vermeer, Industrial Pollution in China and Remedial
Policies, in Managing the Chinese Environment, in MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRON-
MENT 228, 228-61 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed., Oxford University Press 2000); Cythia
W. Cann, Michael C. Cann, & Shanguan Gao, China’s Road to Sustainable Develop-
ment: An Overview, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 3, 3-34 (Kristen A. Day ed., M.E. Sharpe 2005); Frank Wang & Hongfei
Li, Environmental Implications of China’s Energy Demands, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT
AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 180, 180-200 (Kristen A. Day ed.,
M.E. Sharpe 2005).
101. See EDMONDS, supra note 68, at 1-22, 42-157; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 59-
90; Cann et al., supra note 100, at 3-34; Robert F. Ash & Richard L. Edmonds, China’s
Land Resources, Environment, and Agricultural Production, in MANAGING THE CHI-
NESE ENVIRONMENT 112, 112-55 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed., Oxford University Press
2000); James Harkness, Recent Trends in Forestry and Conservation of Biodiversity in
China, in MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT 187, 187-210 (Richard Louis Ed-
monds ed., Oxford University Press 2000).
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conducted vast cleanup campaigns have failed to arrest the trend.
The increase in the amount of industrial and municipal waste-
water discharge has easily offset the impact of any normally mild
or occasionally decisive steps taken to address the problem.102
The difficulties confronting the Chinese authorities on the
ecological front should not be underestimated.  The mushrooming
small-size township and village enterprises, which have under-
pinned reform-era economic dynamism, have been an elusive tar-
get for monitoring and regulatory purposes.  And, from an
environmental perspective, they probably require even closer at-
tention than their much larger state-owned counterparts (which
can hardly be portrayed as ecologically responsible).  By the same
token, an aggressive pursuit of foreign investment and trade op-
portunities has turned China into a destination of choice for some
of the world’s least environmentally-friendly industries and has
provided an impetus for the development of an enormous market
for the resource-intensive segment of the country’s manufacturing
sector (though on the positive side of the ledger, multinationals
have been a vital source of technologies conducive to ecological
progress).  Foreign participation on a significant scale in the do-
mestic economy (including by post-1997 Hong Kong, which has
proved susceptible to bouts of instability) has undoubtedly compli-
cated the task facing policy makers with respect to the
environment.103
Be that as it may, one should not attribute the muted bureau-
cratic response to far-reaching ecological degradation to such fac-
tors alone.  After all, following centuries-long neglect, the reform-
era leadership has proceeded to tackle decisively unbridled popu-
lation growth.  The strategies employed have not been entirely
successful (financial independence of farmers, the product of eco-
nomic liberalization, has increasingly enabled them to turn a
blind eye to the penalties/restrictions imposed and implementa-
tion in provinces heavily populated by ethnic minorities has been
snail-like) and the means relied upon have been controversial.
Nevertheless, from a quantitative perspective, the results
achieved, starting with a high and rapidly expanding base, and in
102. See EDMONDS, PATTERNS OF CHINA’S LOST HARMONY: A SURVEY OF THE COUN-
TRY’S ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PROTECTION, supra note 68, at 1-22, 42-157;
ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 59-90; Cann et al., supra note 100, at 3-34; James E.
Nickum, Is China Living on the Water’s Margin?, in MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRON-
MENT 156, 156-74 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed., Oxford University Press 2000).
103. See supra note 102.
41
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER104.txt unknown Seq: 42  6-MAR-09 13:09
160 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
a relatively short period of time, certainly qualify as
meaningful.104
The reform-era leadership has not necessarily been oblivious
to the formidable environmental challenge confronting the coun-
try.  One notes a tendency among critics of Asian/Chinese ecologi-
cal practices to conceptualize the issue in absolute all-or-nothing
terms.  There is, in fact, evidence to suggest that environmental
consciousness has risen meaningfully at the elite level throughout
the region, even in areas where standards of living are compara-
tively low and combating economic deprivation is an overarching
strategic concern.  The problem, in China and elsewhere, lies in
the relative value accorded to ecological preservation within the
overall policy framework (where characteristically manifestations
of myopic orientation and tunnel vision are not altogether absent),
inadequate institutional architecture, ineffective management,
and uneven implementation.105
Tentative steps to formally place the environment on the gov-
ernmental/political agenda were taken by Premier Zhou Enlai, ap-
parently Mao Zedong’s pragmatic alter ego, as the Cultural
Revolution was entering its final stages. These steps were sub-
stantially augmented as soon as the reformers emerged as the
dominant party faction in the late 1970’s. Wholesale constitu-
tional, statutory, regulatory, and organizational adjustments were
promptly introduced with a view to preserving the ecosystem.
This elaborate and multifaceted process featured several comple-
mentary top-down initiatives, including status enhancement for
the National Environmental Protection Bureau and granting of
additional resources and greater powers to the embattled agency
(perhaps more noteworthy, in the Chinese context, was the ap-
pointment of a highly versatile official as its first chief administra-
tor), and culminated in 1989 in the formal promulgation by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) of
an Environmental Protection Law geared toward radically im-
proving ecological governance and unflinchingly fighting against
pollution in all its forms.106
104. See THE CHANGING POPULATION OF CHINA (Peng Xizhe & Zhigang Guo eds.,
Blackwell Publishers 2000); SUSAN GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINKLER, GOVERNING
CHINA’S POPULATION: FROM LENINIST TO NEOLIBERAL BIOPOLITICS (Stanford Univer-
sity Press 2005).
105. MUSHKAT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASIAN VALUES: LEGAL
NORMS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES supra note 54, at 39-85, 127-30.
106. See QU & LI, supra note 76; LESTER ROSS & MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Quorum Books 1987); Les-
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The flurry of constructive activity during the initial decade of
the post-Mao era generated cautious optimism in domestic policy
circles.  However, serious concerns – indeed, a sense of an inevita-
ble (albeit not imminent) crisis – soon resurfaced.107  It has be-
come abundantly clear that problem recognition, while assuming
an increasingly sophisticated form in the 1990’s and beyond (with
the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED]
in Rio de Janeiro serving as a possible turning point in the learn-
ing process), should not be equated with steadfast execution.  The
realities on the ground have not shifted in a positive direction in
the following two decades.  On the contrary, as indicated earlier,
the picture has continued to deteriorate at an alarming pace.
Official ecological concerns have intensified, rather than di-
minished, during this period.  By the same token, bureaucratic
problem recognition has deepened, rather than receded.  There
has also been a growing willingness to bring the critical issues in-
volved into the open, both at home and in foreign forums.  Perhaps
more importantly, the flurry of activity directed at alleviating en-
vironmental strains has not subsided.  Numerous new and less
opaque laws and administrative regulations have been intro-
duced.  The judicial system has been placed on a somewhat firmer
footing and the courts have begun to selectively display greater
independence (as well as a sense of urgency). The National Protec-
tion Bureau/Agency (NEPA) has been transformed into the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and granted
ministerial status. Its organizational foundations have been rein-
ter Ross & Mitchell A. Silk, Post-Mao China and Environmental Protection: The
Effects of Legal and Politico-Economic Reforms, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 63, 63-89
(1985); LESTER ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA (Indiana University Press
1988); Lester Ross, The Politics of Environmental Policy in the People’s Republic of
China, 20 POL’Y STUD.  J. 628, 628-42 (1992); Bryan Bachner, Regulating Pollution in
the People’s Republic of China: An Analysis of the Enforcement of Environmental Law,
7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 373, 373-408 (1996); Bryan Bachner & Xi Wang,
Environmental Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 523, 523-39 (Chenguang
Wang & Xianchu Zhang eds., Sweet & Maxwell 1997); Richard Lotspeich & Aimin
Chen, Environmental Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 6 J. OF CONTEMP.
CHINA 33, 33-59 (1997); Abigail Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental Protection
in China, 156 CHINA Q. 757, 757-87 (1998); Michael Palmer, Environmental Regula-
tion in the People’s Republic of China: The Face of Domestic Law, 156 CHINA Q. 788,
788-808 (1988); Lin Feng, Law on Environmental Protection, in CHINESE L. 557, 557-
90 (Guiguo Wang & John Mo eds., Kluwer Law International 1999); XIAOYING MA &
LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCE-
MENT, AND COMPLIANCE 13-53 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000).
107. See Wenhui Hou, The Environmental Crisis in China and the Case for Envi-
ronmental History Studies, 14 ENVTL. HIST. REV. 151, 151-58 (1990); Smil, supra note
100, at 211-27.
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forced and the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources
Committee (EPNRC) of the NPC has started to flex its feeble mus-
cles under the leadership of a prominent administrator cum
politician.108
However, as matters stand, the legal system has not evolved
to a point whereby it is capable of underpinning broadly, consist-
ently, and firmly strategies designed to restore ecological har-
mony.  From the top of the organizational pyramid to its bottom,
the fragile structure remains exposed to hard-blowing and shift-
ing political winds.  Law making is a laborious process and the
end product leaves much to be desired in terms of coherence.  Leg-
islative planning is a rather narrow exercise inspired by inputs
from a limited number of relevant parties and thus not reaping
the full benefits commonly derived from widespread participation.
There are abnormally long time lags between the promulgation of
laws and their conversion into instruments requiring compliance.
The judiciary is a marginally less submissive body than in the
past, but it does not enjoy meaningful autonomy and continues to
function in an erratic manner (e.g., without substantial prece-
dents to guide those presiding over cases).  The judicial skill
shortfall has not really been addressed in earnest.109
Such flaws in the governance fac¸ade notwithstanding, the
crux of the matter apparently lies elsewhere.  The overall environ-
108. See Bachner & Wang, supra note 106, at 523-39; Lotspeich & Chen, supra
note 106, at 33-59; Jahiel, supra note 106, at 757-87; Feng, Law on Environmental
Protection, supra note 106, at 557-90; Palmer, supra note 106, at 788-808; MA & ORTO-
LANO, supra note 106, at 13-53; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 91-128; William P. Alford
& Benjamin L. Liebman, Clean Air Clean Processes? The Struggle Over Air Pollution
Law in the People’s Republic of China, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 703-48 (2001); Song
Ying, The Chinese Environmental Lawmaking Framework, 1 CHINESE JIL 225, 225-33
(2002); Xi Wang, China, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE ASIA-PA-
CIFIC RIM 95, 95-136 (Terri Mottershead ed., Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002); Richard J.
Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing
Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 569, 569-602 (2003); Stefanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s
Republic of China, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 185, 185-211 (2006); Alex Wang, The Role of
Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVT’L L.
195, 195-225 (2006-2007).
109. See supra note 108; John Copeland Nagle, The Missing Chinese Environmen-
tal Law Statutory Cases, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 517, 517-55 (1996); Eric W. Orts, Envi-
ronmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 545, 545-67
(2003); Susan J. Martens, Public Participation with Chinese Characteristics: Citizen
Consumers in China’s Environmental Management, 15 ENVTL POLS. 211-30 (2006),
reprinted in, ENVTL. GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 63, 63- 82 (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P.J.
Mol eds., Routledge 2007); see also ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 131-63 (Butterworths Asia 1998).
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mental protection architecture is skewed in favor of goals which
are more in tune with the short/medium-term interests of the re-
gime (solid economic expansion serves best the immediate objec-
tives of the party/ruling elite).  The multi-level institutional
design that is a key feature of the blueprint, and closely reflects
those goals, is a source of powerful centrifugal pressures that im-
pede progress on the ecological front.  At the apex of the organiza-
tional pyramid, SEPA may have been catapulted into ministerial
rank, but it is dwarfed by formidable pro-growth constituencies (it
does not even qualify as the ‘first among equal’ parties engaged in
environmental policy making).  The strategy of unbalanced devel-
opment still shapes realities on the ground, personal imperatives
override institutional constraints, and the campaign mentality is
not abating.110
The multi-level factor manifests itself in the highly decentral-
ized nature of the organizational structure.  Basic principles are
formulated at the center and general guidelines emanate from
there.  Top officials also initiate mass campaigns to address criti-
cal problems of national significance.  Beyond that, authority is
mostly devolved to provincial and local administrators who are be-
holden and hence responsive to politicians/bureaucrats who oper-
ate at the regional level or below and the entrenched interest
groups with whom the latter are aligned.  In this fluid setting, the
center simply lacks the necessary capabilities to promote remedial
measures, monitor conduct, and enforce standards in an ongoing
fashion.  An institutional configuration that has proved instru-
mental in revitalizing the economy has clearly failed to produce
equally salutary effects in the ecological domain.111
This pattern does not dovetail with predictions rooted in con-
ventional economic theory.  On that basis, given effective choice,
one would expect utility-maximizing households, and adversely
impacted enterprises, to vote with their feet and move from areas
where environmental conditions are poor, and corruption presum-
ably rampant, to parts of the country where the quality of life is
110. See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 106, at 1-12, 77-131; ECONOMY, supra note
79, at 91-128; Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s Environmental Governance in
Transition, 15 ENVTL. POLS. 149-70 (2006), reprinted in, ENVTL. GOVERNANCE IN
CHINA 1, 1-22 (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P.J. Mol eds., Routledge 2007); Han Shi & Lei
Zhang, China’s Environmental Governance of Rapid Industrialization, 15 ENVTL.
POLS. 271-92 (2006), reprinted in, ENVTL. GOV. IN CHINA 123, 123-44 (Neil T. Carter &
Arthur P.J. Mol eds., Routledge 2007).
111. See supra note 10; Kenneth G. Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and its
Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation, CHINA ENVTL. SERIES (1997).
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better, and public service delivery is not subject to corrosive influ-
ences on such a scale.  These types of migratory flows have been
observed in large and diversified federal states.112  They may
emerge as an element in the Chinese socio-economic landscape in
the distant future and thus circumscribe the room for maneuver of
politicians/bureaucrats who are incentivized to follow an ecologi-
cally harmful path.  At the current juncture, there is no evidence
to suggest that the preferences of households, and selective enter-
prises, markedly diverge from those of such actors and the choice
available to would-be exit seekers is limited.  Further, because of
prevailing constraints, internal migration decisions are far more
complex than in other federal/polycentric milieus.113
The center has endeavored to contain the centrifugal pres-
sures originating from subnational sources, displaying increasing,
reform-style, rationality in the process.  Consistent with the para-
digm shift witnessed in the regulatory domain over the past three
decades or so,114 it has progressively opted to bypass the malfunc-
tioning state administrative machinery and pockets of provincial/
local resistance in favor of civil society players (notably the media
and non-governmental organizations) and market-based steering
mechanisms.115  Interestingly, this has not been the product of en-
112. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. OF POL.
ECON. 416, 416-24 (1956); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institu-
tions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 1, 1-31 (1995).
113. E.g., DELIA DAVIN, INTERNAL MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 4-19 (St.
Martin’s Press 1999) (discussing the historical complexities of internal migration re-
strictions in China).
114. See, e.g., BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION CREAT-
ING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS (Columbia University Press,
1980) (discussing generally the paradigm shift in the regulatory domain over the last
3 decades); see also ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (Oxford University Press 1999); ATLE MIDTTUN &
EIRIK SVINDLAND, APPROACHES AND DILEMMAS IN ECONOMIC REGULATION POLITICS, EC-
ONOMICS AND DYNAMICS (Palgrave 2001); CONTROLLING MODERN GOVERNMENT VARI-
ETY, COMMONALITY AND CHANGE (Christopher Hood, et al. eds., Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited 2004); BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND REGULATION (Cambridge University Press 2007).
115. See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 106, at 13-76; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at
129-74; Martens, supra note 109, at 63-82; Mol & Carter, supra note 110, at 1-22; Shi
& Zhang, supra note 110, at 123-44; Eric Zusman & Jennifer L. Turner, Beyond the
Bureaucracy: Changing China’s Policymaking Environment, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT
& THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 121, 121-49 (Kristen A. Day ed.,
M.E. Sharpe 2005); Richard D. Morgenstern, et al., Emissions Trading to Improve Air
Quality in an Industrial City in the People’s Republic of China, in CHINA’S ENVIRON-
MENT & THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 150, 150-79 (Kristen A. Day ed., M.E.
Sharpe 2005); Elizabeth Knup, Environmental NGOs in China: An Overview, CHINA
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tirely passive accommodation in that the center has actively, al-
beit not indiscriminately, facilitated entry into the strategic arena
of elements not associated with the normally tightly-controlled po-
litical establishment.  That in itself may not lead to dramatic im-
provement in environmental performance, yet it may arguably be
viewed as a major step forward in this particular cultural/develop-
mental/institutional context.
EVALUATION
An examination of the Chinese experience in the ecological
sphere lends strong support to Hancock’s assertion that the study
of environmental law, both the descriptive and prescriptive facets,
ought to be firmly grounded in social theory reflecting, where ap-
propriate, long-standing historical trends.  In this pivotal case, as
outlined here, it is abundantly clear that there are broad recur-
ring patterns which, unless thoroughly explored and properly in-
corporated into the analytical framework, may prevent legal
researchers from providing adequate enlightenment and effective
direction.  By putting forth a comprehensive proposal for signifi-
cantly enhancing the status of environmental rights whose intel-
lectual parameters extend well beyond traditional international
law, and even jurisprudence/philosophy, deeply into the realm of
the social sciences, Hancock may have made a vital contribution to
the evolution of legal scholarship focused on the global ecosystem.
However, a dissection of Chinese politico-economic dynamics
suggests that the specific theoretical perspective adopted is not
sufficiently robust to sustain claims of wide, let alone universal,
relevance/validity.  The fit between the analytical hypotheses for-
mulated (in fact, contentions advanced) and the social realities
portrayed in this paper does not seem to be close.  The general
prescriptions offered, an observation that applies to Hayward’s
more tightly packaged recommendations as well, also fall well
short of addressing challenges confronting authorities in a highly
ENVIRONMENTAL SERIES 9, 9-15 (1997); Peter Ho, Greening Without Conflict? Environ-
mentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. AND CHANGE 893, 893-921
(2001); Ann Brettell, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations in the People’s
Republic of China: Innocents in a Co-opted Environmental Movement?, 6 J. OF PACIFIC
ASIA 27, 27-56 (2000); Jolene Lin Shuwen, Assessing the Dragon’s Choice: The Use of
Market-Based Instruments in Chinese Environmental Policy, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 617, 617-55 (2004); Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Governance: the Emerg-
ing Economic Dimension, 15 ENVTL. POLS. 171-189 (2006); Phillip Stalley & Dongning
Yang, An Emerging Environmental Movement in China?, 186 THE CHINA Q. 333-56
(2006).
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fragmented and inadequately institutionalized setting. Given the
strong emphasis in contemporary policy literature and practice
(loosely reflected in the international environmental principle of
“common but differentiated responsibility”) of carefully matching
normative designs and contexts,116 that is a feature which consid-
erably detracts from the effectiveness of the ambitious legal
scheme propounded.
The theoretical framework underpinning Hancock’s advocacy
of environmental human rights essentially consists of two con-
cepts/variables: form, or rather capitalist form, of social organiza-
tion (the exogenous/ independent variable) and ecological
degradation (the endogenous/ dependent variable).  One-way
causal influences run from the former to the latter, although in
the long term the relationship may turn into one of a reciprocal
nature because capitalist environmental excesses apparently con-
tain the seeds of their own destruction. The economic rationality
paradigm, class hegemony, agent autonomy or lack thereof, and
co-optation are other concepts/variables that loom large in the an-
alytical discourse, but are merely manifestations of a particular
form of social organization rather than intervening variables in
the strict sense of the word.117
Hancock’s liberal critique of capitalist ecological transgres-
sions has an unmistakably traditional-style Marxist dimension.118
The power exercised, whether directly or via proxy, by the social
class controlling investments, labor, and production is to all in-
tents and purposes limitless (hence hegemony).  Sources of resis-
tance are summarily removed and swiftly transformed into
conforming entities (hence lack of agent autonomy and co-opta-
tion).  Decision calculus, along the entire organizational chain, is
anchored in materialistic logic of the anthropocentric variety
(hence the distortions engendered by economic rationality).  The
approach is traditional in its orientation because it does not incor-
116. RAUL P. LEJANO, FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS MERGING TEXT AND CON-
TEXT (Routledge 2006).
117. See DAVID W. BRITT, A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO MODELING: QUALITA-
TIVE AND QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers
1997) (providing an illuminating discussion of concepts, variables, theory construction
and building); DAVID A. DE VAUS, RESEARCH DESIGN IN SOCIAL RESEARCH (Sage Publi-
cations 2001).
118. RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (Basic Books 1969) (high-
lighting these Marxist similarities); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES (Ran-
dom House, 1970); ERIC O. WRIGHT, CLASS, CRISIS AND THE STATE (NLB 1978)
(discussing works highlighting the similarities between Hancock’s liberal critique of
capitalist ecological transgressions and Marxism).
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porate assumptions underlying structural or functionalist Marx-
ism.  The latter perspective is of a more recent vintage and it
provides a broader basis for examining the interplay between so-
cial forces and the environment.  It focuses in a flexible fashion on
the role played by the state, and politics in general, in safeguard-
ing and reproducing the capitalist social order rather than on the
class structure underpinning it.119
While the structural/functionalist variant offers greater scope
for analytical exploration than its traditional counterpart, neither
theoretical framework can readily accommodate within its narrow
confines the intricate contours of centuries-long Chinese ecological
history.  The country has been in a perpetual state of flux, shed-
ding one form of social organization after another, constantly
reinventing itself politically and economically, always tinkering
with its tenuous institutional fac¸ade.  However, the tumultuous
transformations witnessed have had very modest impact on the
environment.  The delicate man-nature equation has been virtu-
ally static, sinking periodically further into negative territory in
the wake of more-reckless-than-usual elite/governmental prac-
tices.  Interestingly, perhaps the most wanton exploitation of the
ecosystem was seen at the height of communist rule, prompting a
prominent historian to title her book Mao’s War against
Nature.120
The pattern observed in China may not be the exception to
the norm.  Researchers focusing on pre-reform Eastern Europe
and Soviet Union have also noted comparatively high levels of en-
vironmental degradation.  They have attributed this phenomenon
to the absence of enforceable property rights under socialism, lim-
ited wealth accumulation (ecological improvement is viewed as a
superior good, the demand for which increases as affluence rises),
and substantial defense spending (which provides a powerful
stimulus to heavy industry in general and military industry in
particular, setting the stage for the emergence of a sprawling and
entrenched military-industrial complex).121  The theory is in its
119. Classical examinations of critical social issues in this vein include: JAMES
O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (St. Martin’s Press 1973); SAMUEL
BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (Basic Books 1976);
IAN GOUGH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE (The Macmillan Press
Ltd. 1979).
120. See SHAPIRO, supra note 79.
121. See JOAN DEBARDELEBEN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND MARXISM-LENINISM: THE
SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN EXPERIENCE 45-60 (Westview Press 1985); Benjamin
Zycher, Environmental Degradation Under East European State Socialism, in UNCER-
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embryonic phase, but it lends support to the conclusion that envi-
ronmental decay is not the product of capitalist excesses alone but
a problem that confronts humankind in a variety of social set-
tings.  To infer otherwise would have the unfortunate implication
that no resources should be channeled to combat ecological
hazards in countries where capitalism does not constitute the
mainstay of the economic system.
As to hegemony, ruthless elite domination has been a salient
characteristic of the Chinese political order over the centuries.
However, it would evidently be inappropriate to view this as a
manifestation of Marxist-style influences rooted in a rigid class
structure reflecting a particular mode of economic production/so-
cial control.  By the same token, elite domination should not be
equated with elite cohesion for rampant factionalism has resulted
in a high degree of political fragmentation, detracting from the
ability of power holders to shape developments on the ground.
Moreover, tight reign by an ensconced elite has been a variable
rather than a constant in that there have been endless cycles of
centralization and decentralization.122  During phases marked by
a shift of authority from the center to the periphery, grassroots
initiative has not been greatly circumscribed.
The notion of persistent agent co-optation, or chronic lack of
autonomy, is equally difficult to reconcile with Chinese historical
realities.  A system which is in a perpetual state of flux is by defi-
nition inherently unstable and susceptible to shocks, both of the
endogenous and exogenous type.  Imperial China had witnessed
the rise and fall of several dynasties, a nascent republican edifice
had crumbled in the face of a communist onslaught, and socialist
utopia has given way to a mixed-economy that is moving, steadily
if not inexorably, in a capitalist direction.  This attests to the po-
tential for agent-induced change, at least in certain circum-
stances.123  In the climate currently prevailing, environmental
TAINTY AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARMEN A. ALCHIAN 143-51
(John R. Lott, Jr. ed., Routledge 1997).
122. CHI’EN MU, TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN IMPERIAL CHINA: A CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS (Chinese University Press 1982) (providing a vivid illustration); RAY HUANG,
CHINA: A MACRO HISTORY (Sharpe 1988).
123. See STEPHEN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS passim (Princeton University Press 1995) (providing survey
of mainstream, i.e. positivist, social science literature on agent-induced macro-level
change).
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protests are common and not entirely ineffective.124 As noted pre-
viously, civil society is also providing some input into environmen-
tal management, not without selective government blessing.
The economic rationality paradigm and the unpalatable eco-
logical scenarios which it seemingly conjures up have been
shrouded in much controversy. This analytical construct is enthu-
siastically embraced in certain academic and policy circles and
categorically rejected in others.  An interesting trend that appears
to be emerging is to eschew polarization and to endeavor to syn-
thesize the vision embodied in the utility-maximizing Homo
economicus model of human behavior and that grounded in the
environmental limit discourse/duty based approach (seeking to
draw its inspiration from Homo moralis).125 It is a moot point
whether such intellectual subtleties, which otherwise have consid-
erable practical ramifications, are entirely relevant in the present
Chinese developmental/ ecological context.
Behaviorally-oriented social scientists are less concerned with
the normative underpinnings of the economic rationality para-
digm, or the rational-comprehensive model of decision making,
than with its explanatory power.  They argue that the prevalence
of internal and external constraints prevents individuals and col-
lective entities (particularly public organizations) from following a
strictly rational path.  Some substitute bounded rationality for its
comprehensive counterpart in their work.126  Others display even
greater skepticism and claim that human decision making is an
incremental affair, featuring plodding, stepwise movement (from
an established base, rather than in an innovative fashion) or
“muddling through.”127  The merits of hybrid-like models, blend-
ing more rational and less rational elements (e.g., mixed scan-
ning)128 are also highlighted but, at the agnostic end of the
rationality-irrationality spectrum, it is contended that decision
124. See Ho, supra note 115; ECONOMY, supra note 79, at 129-75; Zusman & Tur-
ner, supra note 115; Martens, supra note 109; Mol & Carter, supra note 110; Ha &
Zhang, supra note 110; Stalley & Yang, supra note 115; CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE,
CONFLICT, AND RESISTANCE (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Seldon, eds., Routledge 2000).
125. E.g., William Konchak & Unai Pascual, Converging Economic Paradigms for
a Constructive Environmental Policy Discourse, 9 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 10, 10-21
(2006).
126. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (Macmillan 1957).
127. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 78, 78-88 (1959); DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF
DECISION 61-79 (Free Press 1963).
128. See Amitai Etzioni, Mixed Screening: A “Third” Approach to Decision Making,
27 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 385, 385-92 (1967).
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making, at least in public organizations, is such an incoherent ex-
ercise that policy evolution is not fundamentally different from
the accumulation of rubbish in a garbage can (the “garbage can”
analogy).129
If the economic rationality paradigm emphatically prescribes
but does not adequately describe, or is merely an ideal model not
firmly anchored in institutional reality, its empirical assessment
is inevitably fraught with considerable difficulties.  After all, how
can one productively examine the practical consequences of a nor-
mative framework that apparently does not guide organizational
behavior?  This conundrum need not be explored here.  Suffice it
to say that, for the most part, policy formulation in China in gen-
eral, and in the environmental domain in particular, has appar-
ently followed a pattern encapsulated in the garbage can model.
As pointed out earlier, over the past three decades, as economic
liberalization has entered a more mature stage, there has been a
discernible shift toward incrementalism and traces of rational
thinking have begun to manifest themselves in organizational set-
tings, an observation applicable to the public sector.  On the
whole, in this specific context and at this specific juncture, that
seems to be a positive development, although the final verdict
must be withheld as the new ecological initiatives have been de-
scribed in detail yet not thoroughly analyzed130 and the entire
strategic configuration remains typically fluid.
China’s severe environmental problems can hardly be attrib-
uted to a rigid adherence to the economic rationality paradigm.  A
review of its distinctly poor ecological record exposes far greater
deficiencies on the government than the (nascent) market side.
Fundamental institutional inadequacies at both ends of the pub-
lic-private continuum have been highlighted in the social science
literature.  Originally, close attention was accorded to market fail-
ure and potential public sector remedies thereto.  In recent years,
interest has gravitated toward government failure and mecha-
nisms to address it.131  Such “failure” (which includes regulatory
129. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, Ambiguity and Choice in Organiza-
tions 24-37 (Universitetsforlaget 1976).
130. See generally Richard Lotspeich, Comparative Environmental Policy: Market-
Type Instruments in Industrialized Countries, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 85, 85-104 (1998)
(providing an example for what may be required in terms of analytical insight).
131. See CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENT: CHOOSING BETWEEN IM-
PERFECT ALTERNATIVES 17-29, 36-55, 62-85 (MIT Press 1989) (1988); MARTIN JANICKE,
STATE FAILURE: THE IMPOTENCE OF POLITICS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (Polity Press
1990).
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malfunctioning) is assumed to be a universal phenomenon reflect-
ing innate organizational characteristics.  It is not unreasonable
to conclude that the Chinese variant has been a particularly per-
nicious malaise, engendering symptoms (e.g., bureaucratic inco-
herence and personalism) seldom witnessed on such a scale
elsewhere and aggravating market failure in the process.
Hancock compellingly argues that theoretical enlightenment
must precede policy prescription.  Attempting to reconfigure a so-
cial system without coming to grips with its inner workings is an
intellectually risky undertaking.  Issuing a reminder to this effect
to international legal scholars focusing on environmental issues is
appropriate because of the tendency on their part to proceed
promptly from description to recommendations, largely bypassing
the conceptual phase.  However, the rigidly structured cluster of
variables (capitalist social order, class hegemony, agent subservi-
ence/co-optation, economic rationality paradigm) that Hancock in-
vokes for this purpose is too restrictive to be deemed widely
relevant/valid.  The crucially important Chinese experience sug-
gests that additional analytical perspectives should be summoned
to underpin the policy/legal engineering effort.
In this case, given the high degree of institutional fragmenta-
tion and resilience of parochial interests, group models of politics
and their public choice counterparts may provide a more effective
theoretical framework for identifying and removing impediments
to progress on the environmental front.  The former are premised
on the assumption that political activity essentially consists of
competition between groups over policy-related issues.  The mo-
dus operandi of these entities does not necessarily reflect a spe-
cific form of social organization (capitalism or its alternatives) and
the relationship between them is assessed empirically rather than
defined a priori.  Groups may thus feature prominently in socialist
politics (even in a yet unrealized liberal social order) and they
may, for all intents and purposes, compete as equal rather than
achieve total domination (substantial influence in a certain policy
area is another possible outcome).132
132. See Bruce B. De Mesquita, David Neuman & Alvin Rabushka, FORECASTING
POLITICAL EVENTS: THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 11-49 (Yale University Press 1998)
(1985) (intriguing application of group models of politics in Chinese context); BRUCE
B. DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEUMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG 35-
47 (Chatham House 1998) (1996); see also JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE
COMMUNIST POLITICS 1-21 (Cambridge University Press 2000) (1994).
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Public choice theorists contend that actors in the political
arena, both on the demand side (e.g., voters) and the supply side
(e.g., executive office-holders, legislators, and bureaucrats) are
primarily motivated by self-interest rather than lofty ideals.  In-
deed, they often pursue their individual objectives to the detri-
ment of collective well-being.  In the regulatory domain, this
stance is adopted by proponents of the private interest model put
forth by members of the Chicago school of economics who question
the validity of propositions underlying approaches predicated on
the notion of public interest-driven officials.133  Such theoretical
perspectives are slowly (compared with their more familiar group
counterparts) making inroads into the field of Chinese policy stud-
ies, particularly at the subnational level, and generating useful
insights.134
Several factors combine to undermine ecological governance
in China.  As shown in this paper, the proliferation of largely au-
tonomous and opportunity-seeking groups within and without the
bureaucracy is by far the most important.  The problem manifests
itself throughout the organizational pyramid, but the symptoms
become particularly acute as one moves from the administrative
center to the provincial/local periphery.  The malaise plaguing the
system cannot be earnestly addressed unless it is conceptualized
in such terms.  The issue is one of state capacity to effect change.
It is accorded scant attention in the environmental studies litera-
133. See MITNICK, supra note 114, at 79-240; BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 114, at
18-33; see Alfred Haid, The Chicago School of Regulatory Theory, in MIDTTUN & SVIN-
DLAND, supra note 114, at 74-78; MORGAN & YEUNG, supra note 114, at 16-78; CHRIS-
TOPHER HOOD, ECONOMIC POLICY REVERSALS 19-56 (Open University Press 1994); S.
Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation, in A
READER ON REGULATION 92-130 (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood
eds., Oxford University Press 1998).
134. See generally GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES (Sharpe 1990); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN POST-MAO
CHINA (Elizabeth J. Perry & Christine Wong eds., Harvard University Press 1985);
JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA (Sharpe 1997); JI-
ANRONG HUANG, THE APPLICABILITY OF POLICY-MAKING THEORIES IN POST-MAO CHINA
(Ashgate 1999); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S PROVINCES: COMPETITIVE AND
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES (Hans Hendrischke & Feng Chongyi eds., Routledge 1999);
THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN & XIAOBO LU, TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION IN CONTEM-
PORARY RURAL CHINA (Cambridge University Press 2003); ANDREW HALL WEDEMAN,
FROM MAO TO MARKET: RENT SEEKING, LOCAL PROTECTIONISM, AND MARKETIZATION IN
CHINA (Cambridge University Press 2003); HUI FENG, THE POLITICS OF CHINA’S AC-
CESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE DRAGON GOES GLOBAL (Routledge
2006); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Sovereignty Revis-
ited: A Re-Examination of the Public Choice in Light of China’s Accession to the World
Trade Organization 7 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 115, 115-49 (2007).
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ture135 and is generally overlooked by legal researchers immersed
in traditional-style inquiries.  However, the subject looms large on
the agenda of scholars in related fields and their findings have a
bearing on the debate regarding the critical steps that need to be
taken in order to revitalize ecological management in the
country.136
The prevailing view is that state capacity is distinctly weak in
China.  Periodically and selectively, the party/government appara-
tus displays unqualified willingness to confront serious problems
in the face of stubborn resistance from vested interests, define the
challenge unambiguously in such circumstances, mobilize re-
sources on a scale commensurate with requirements, and pursue
its strategies in a determined fashion on a sustainable basis.  Ef-
forts to stabilize the size of the population, while highly controver-
sial and not entirely successful, apparently fall into this
category.137  Another well-known example is the great lengths to
which the administrative center was prepared to go in order to
reassert its tenuous authority in the battle against the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Again, the tactics employed
were at times questionable and it would be inappropriate to por-
tray the performance as a bureaucratic tour de force.  Neverthe-
135. See Jonathan Schwartz, The Impact of State Capacity on Enforcement of Envi-
ronmental Policies: The Case of China, 12 J. ENV’T & DEV. 50, 50-81 (2003) (providing
a notable exception to the norm); see also Liu Yu et al. The Politics and Ethics of
Going Green in China: Air Pollution in Benxi City and Wetland Preservation in the
Sanjiang Plain, in FORGING ENVIRONMENTALISM: JUSTICE, LIVELIHOOD, AND CON-
TESTED ENVIRONMENTS 31, 31-101 (Joanne Bauer ed., M.E. Sharpe 2006).
136. See VIVIENNE SHUE, THE REACH OF THE STATE: SKETCHES OF THE CHINESE
BODY POLITIC (Stanford University Press 1988); STATE POWER AND SOCIAL FORCES:
DOMINATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD (Joel S. Migdal et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press 1994); WANG SHAOGUANG & HU ANGANG, THE CHINESE
ECONOMY IN CRISIS: STATE CAPACITY AND TAX REFORM (Sharpe 2001); Wang
Shaoguang, The Problem of State Weakness, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 36, 36-42 (2003); Dali
L. Yang, Population Control and State Coercion in China, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 43, 43-50
(2003); HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE
POST-DENG ERA, 193-201 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2004); Wang Shaoguang, Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Mode
of Governance in China, 15 J. CONTEMP. P.R.C. 1, 1-30 (2006); Tim Wright, State Ca-
pacity in Contemporary China: Closing the Pits and Reducing Coal Production, 16 J.
CONTEMP. P.R.C. 173, 173-94 (2007); Jonathan Schwartz & Gregory Evans, Causes of
Effective Policy Implementation: China’s Public Response to SARS, 16 J. CONTEMP.
P.R.C. 195, 195-213 (2007).
137. See Peng & Guo, supra note 104; GREENHAUGH & WINKLER, supra note 104;
Yanzhong Huang & Dali L. Yang, Population Control and State Coercion in China, in
HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG
ERA 193, 193-225 (Barry M. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., Cambridge University
Press 2004).
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less, the episode serves to illustrate that, at certain junctures and
when certain conditions materialize, concerted and effective state
action may eventuate.138
Such consistently steadfast responses are considered to be an
exception to the norm. There is no evidence to indicate that they
are commonly observed in the ecological domain.  To arrest cur-
rent trends in this sphere, top priority must be accorded for the
foreseeable future to restoring relevant state capacity.  Promoting
environmental human rights via international legal channels (as
Hancock proposes) or constitutional ones (as Hayward recom-
mends) is not likely to have a tangible impact on the institutional
dynamics, given prevailing constraints and regime orientations.
Indeed, one of the suggestions put forth, to grant the collective
ownership of natural resources human right status may have to
be recalibrated in light of the Chinese political record.  Private
land ownership may have been a source of ecological disruptions,
but they have paled in comparison with the disastrous conse-
quences of Mao-inspired campaigns to eradicate it.139  Reform-era
de-collectivization initiatives, while by no means environmentally
costless, have been a relatively mild affair.140
If feeble state capacity is the major impediment to ecological
improvement and the imperative to revitalize it overshadows
other exigencies, administrative law, broadly defined,141 may be a
more potent (and politically less provocative) instrument for in-
ducing institutional change in the medium term.  Above all, there
is a need to reinforce the environmental protection machinery and
meaningfully immunize it against powerful opportunistic pres-
sures/widespread rent seeking.  This calls for expertise in organi-
zational design, but legal insights may also prove useful.  The
work of Majone is particularly illuminating in this respect for he
has effectively blended microeconomic concepts and legal princi-
ples in an attempt to identify institutional mechanisms capable of
138. See Shwartz & Evans, supra note 136.
139. JASPER BECKER, HUNGRY GHOSTS: MAO’S SECRET FAMINE (Free Press 1998).
140. See Peter Ho, China’s Rangelands Under Stress: A Comparative Study of Pas-
ture Commons in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 31 DEV. & CHANGE 385, 385-
412 (2000); Peter Ho, Rangeland Degradation in China Revisited?, 37 J. DEV. STUDIES
99, 99-132 (2001); Tony Banks, Property Rights and the Environment in Pastoral
China: Evidence from the Field, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 717, 717-40 (2001); Tony Banks et
al., Community-Based Grassland Management in Western China: Rationale, Pilot Ex-
perience, and Policy Implications, 23 MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 132, 132-40 (2003).
141. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZA-
TION THROUGH LAW REFORM (New York University Press 2004).
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enhancing the independence of regulators within a credible princi-
pal-agent framework potentially palatable to soft authoritari-
ans.142  Following this analytical path in some crucial non-
Western/Northern settings may turn out to be a more productive
strategy than unhesitatingly embracing grand international legal/
constitutional blueprints.
The choice of regulatory instrument also ought to loom larger
on the reform agenda and should be more comprehensively ad-
dressed by those involved in shaping it.  This observation applies
to civil society input as well.  Certain regulatory instruments (e.g.,
incentive-based systems, market-harnessing controls, disclosure,
rights and liabilities, and public compensation/social insurance
schemes) are inherently less burdensome for capacity-constrained
states than others (e.g., command & control and direct action) and
they are less susceptible to capture/distortion by vested interests
to boot.  China is already moving in this direction, but the effort is
spearheaded by economists with modest contribution (almost ex-
clusively descriptive in nature) by lawyers. The former tend to as-
sume that regulatory instruments are value-free and not subject
to institutional influences.  Awareness of the intricate relation-
ship between instrument and context should enable legal scholars
to play a constructive role in ecological planning.
Capacity-constrained states need to seek partners outside the
public sector in order to enhance their environmental manage-
ment capabilities.  Civil society is ideally positioned to offer effec-
tive cooperation, if it can maintain a significant measure of
independence.  This obviously is a double-edged sword for authori-
tarian regimes because environmental NGOs, key actors in the
civil society sector, are often at the forefront of the struggle for
democratic reform.143 Nevertheless, there is a growing realization
in China that NGOs simply have to be brought into the ecological
decision-making process and that it is preferable to pursue this
objective in an orderly rather than disruptive fashion.144  Again,
142. See Giandomenico Majone, Non-Majoritarian Institutions and the Limits of
Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach, 157 J. INST’L & THEO-
RETICAL ECON. 57, 57-78 (2001).
143. See ASIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Yok-
Shiu F. Lee & Alvin Y. So eds., Sharpe 1999); see also David J. Frank, Wesley
Longhofer & Evan Schofer, World Society, NGOs and Environmental Policy Reform in
Asia, 48 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 275, 275-95 (2007).
144. See generally ELIZABETH KNUP, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN CHINA: AN OVER-
VIEW (Woodrow Wilson Center 1997); Ann Brettell, Environmental Non-Governmental
Organizations in the People’s Republic of China: Innocents in a Co-opted Environmen-
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there is scope for lawyers to tangibly contribute in this respect
because of their substantive and procedural expertise (the latter
dimension is particularly relevant), but thus far they have not
earnestly tackled this challenge.
CONCLUSION
The deterioration in global environmental conditions contin-
ues unabated, albeit with marked variations over space and time.
The dangers posed by global warming in particular are apparently
escalating at an exponential pace, but the hazards manifest them-
selves across the entire ecological spectrum. An Inconvenient
Truth, Al Gore’s award-winning documentary film, and the more
restrained Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change145
recently produced by the British Government have been instru-
mental in highlighting graphically, although not uncontrover-
sially, the grave threats potentially confronting the biosphere.
Policy responses, both domestic and international, are believed
not to have been commensurate with those threats, as evidenced
by the snail-like progress on the Kyoto Protocol front.
Academic researchers have endeavored to fill key gaps in the
problem-solving architecture by putting forth radical ideas for a
wholesale realignment of global strategies and institutions for
coping with the looming dangers. The legal profession has been a
vital source of such initiatives acting as a platform for a wide
range of innovative proposals, including ones to bring full parity
between the status of environmental rights and that of the juridi-
cally more elevated human rights.  Proposals of this nature are
not altogether new, but the latest wave has been characterized by
tal Movement?, 6 J. PAC. ASIA 27, 27-56 (2000); ELIZABETH J. PERRY & MARK SELDEN,
CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE (Routledge 2003); Peter Ho,
Greening Without Conflict: Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China 32
DEV. & CHANGE 893, 893-921 (2001); ECONOMY, supra note 79; Eric Zusman & Jen-
nifer L. Turner, Beyond the Bureaucracy: Changing China’s Policymaking Environ-
ment, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
121 (Kristin A. Day, ed., Sharpe 2005); Susan Martens, Public Participation with Chi-
nese Characteristics: Citizen Consumers in China’s Environmental Management, 15
ENVTL. POL. 211, 211-30 (2006); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s Environ-
mental Governance in Transition, 15 ENVTL. POL. 149, 149-70 (2006); Ha Shi & Lei
Zhang, China’s Environmental Governance of Rapid Industrialization, 15 ENVTL. POL.
149, 149-70 (2006); Phillip Stalley & Dongning Yang, An Emerging Environmental
Movement in China, 168 P.R.C. Q. 333, 333-56 (2006).
145. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW
(Cambridge University Press 2007).
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substantial philosophical and theoretical deepening.  The propos-
als have also become increasingly detailed and wide in scope.
The recommendations offered may be assessed from a variety
of perspectives.  For example, it has been argued that the quest for
ecological harmony may be impeded rather than advanced if
couched in human rights terms.146 A different analytical path
leads to the examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the
recommendations and their possible effectiveness as a universal
tool to address practical problems in concrete settings. The evalu-
ation undertaken in this paper suggests that the theoretical foun-
dations are not sufficiently robust to support the policy fac¸ade
erected.  Universal claims of situational relevance, whether ex-
plicit or implicit, also cannot be readily sustained.  Analysts can
shrink their geographical horizons, as one of the authors (Hay-
ward) whose seminal study is scrutinized here ultimately opts to
do, and retreat into European territory or some other narrow seg-
ment of the international system.  However, excluding very large
and ecologically most problematic countries (such as China) from
the strategic equation is not a viable proposition.  A genuinely uni-
versal policy framework, and one of a multi-layered variety, will
not emerge without further socio-legal exploration of Eastern/
Southern realities.
146. See Kerry Woods, What Does the Language of Human Rights Bring to Cam-
paigns for Environmental Justice?, 15 ENVTL. POL. 572, 572-91 (2006).
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